A/55/280/Add.1 143. As Turkish history since the foundation of the Republic clearly demonstrates (and as is perhaps to be expected), the relationship between religion and secularism has never been an idyllic one. Nor, from the legal viewpoint, has it been governed by the principles of separation and neutrality. Secularism was vigorously enforced against religion until 1946, but with the introduction of a multiparty system in 1945 electoral competition led at times to the political manipulation of religion, and concessions began to be made to religion vis-à-vis secularism (for example, the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 was seen by many as a triumph of religion over atheism, while in 1974 the role of the National Salvation Party in government resulted in the multiplication of schools for preachers and a proIslamic revision to school textbooks) and at other times to a reaffirmation of secularism over, or even against, religion (for example the military coup of September 1980, which claimed to be inspired by Kemalism). 144. In addition, attention must be drawn to the vigorous survival of religious traditions in rural areas, despite the coming of the Republic and of policies promoting modernization and education. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a renewed search for a strong Islamic identity in the major urban centres, where people have been more receptive to secular notions. Attention must also be drawn to the rise and expansion of Islamism, which is making itself felt particularly in heightened political militancy, the danger of which cannot be underestimated. 145. Finally, the active policy of Turkization, as an expression of nationalism, has meant that the great majority of society has come to regard citizenship solely in terms of Turkish ethnicity and Muslim identity. 146. Politics is thus the determining element with respect to religion: on one hand, the State, the guardian of secularism and defender of nationalism, has taken over responsibility for the majority religion, both within its own ranks and among the population, while on the other hand the political parties, including those of Islamist persuasion, use religion as a route to power. This situation not only affects strictly religious affairs but also has an impact on secularism and on healthy nationalism, and hence on all religious communities. 147. With respect to the majority, the Special Rapporteur understands the legitimate concerns of the authorities in the face of religious extremism, which 26 cannot be tolerated since it leaves no room for human rights and stifles all expressions of diversity and pluralism. The Special Rapporteur nevertheless believes that the active role played by the State in religious affairs constitutes excessive interference not only in the way people manifest their belief but also against the very concept of freedom of religion and belief. This is true, for example, with the compulsory religious and ethics courses that have on occasion become tools of ideological indoctrination (see above). This situation weighs most heavily upon the minority Muslim communities, including the Alawi, in the sense that State intrusion into Muslim religious affairs leaves no room for the specific needs of the Alawis, particularly in terms of places of worship and religious education. Moreover, Turkization policies reinforce the discriminatory treatment of Alawis within Turkish society and even within the State (they have, for example, no representation in the Department of Religious Affairs). 148. When it comes to non-Muslims, with the notable exception of the Jewish minority, their situation poses a problem in terms of the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination, and is a direct result of State policies on secularism and nationalism, analyzed above. The political manipulation of nationalism (which may be linked, in part, to external events such as the European powers’ intervention at the end of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Christian minorities, or to the Cyprus question) has made itself felt in particular, and in an intolerant and discriminatory way, against the Christian minorities. This particular form of nationalism pervades not only State institutions but society as a whole, and generally conveys a message that leaves no room for the Christian minorities. These policies have sparked the massive departure of members of these minorities from Turkey. The Special Rapporteur has examined the situation, distinguishing between the communities deemed to be covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and recognized as minorities, and those excluded from this category. 149. With respect to the Christian, Greek Orthodox and Armenian (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant) minorities, it is useful to examine the situations that they face in common, as well as the specific circumstances of each group. 150. In the first place, representatives of these minorities say that they enjoy freedom of religion and worship but that they face problems affecting the