CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 that she has put forward general statements and has not provided evidence of the alleged acts of discrimination against the various groups of women which she has mentioned, whereas the State party has refuted, in detail, each and every one of the general statements made by the author. 3.2 In my view, this case stems from a problem that arose between the author and her former partner, W.S., who appears to have used — and abused — his position of authority as a board member of the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority to request, in February 1992, and to secure, in June 1993, the removal of the author’s name from the Assignment of Lease, which certified the author’s co-ownership of Parcel No. 138, by the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. It is probable that the removal of the author’s name from that document was obtained by fraudulent means by W. S., who did not meet any of the eligibility requirements for property ownership in Rae-Edzo. The circumstances under which this occurred were not investigated and, to this day, it remains an open question as to whether or not a punishable criminal offence was committed by W.S. and one or more employees of the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. No light has been shed on the facts surrounding the disappearance of the corresponding file either. 3.3 I do not, in particular, share the conclusions reached by the Committee concerning the violence suffered by the author at the hands of her former partner. In June 1993, when the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation assigned — whether as the result of an error, negligence or a conspiracy to commit fraud — Parcel No. 138, which had until that point in time been co-owned by the author and her former partner, to W.S. as sole rightsholder, the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation had not been made aware of the difficulties that the author was experiencing in her relationship with W.S. and, more specifically, had not been informed that the author was a victim, if the statements made in the communication are to be believed, of violence, threats, repeated sexual abuse and intimidation and was being prevented from engaging in gainful employment. The Corporation did not learn of the author’s situation until 1996, when she filed the second suit. Before that, when the author had filed the first suit, in May 1995, W.S. was the sole defendant. Thus it was through two civil actions, filed (but not pursued) in 1995 and in 1996/1998–2003, that the Canadian authorities learned of the author’s allegations concerning the violence committed upon her by her former partner. Thus, in my view, the State party cannot be charged with having failed to exercise due diligence in this case. 3.4 Nor do I share the Committee’s view, as expressed in paragraph 10.4 of the communication, that the State party failed to ensure that its agents provided legal protection to the author. It is certainly surprising that the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation did not undertake an inquiry into the circumstances under which the author’s name was removed from the contract once the Corporation was informed of this situation by the author in 1996; at the very least, this bespeaks an inexplicable lapse on the part of that housing authority in the enforcement of its own rules on the assignment of properties, but the author has not demonstrated that this lapse constituted discrimination against her. An error, or even an act of fraud, leading to the removal of her name from the Assignment of Lease and a failure to undertake proper monitoring and, if appropriate, to rectify that error in the corresponding documents do not in themselves constitute discrimination against the author. Nor did the author advance this argument in a Canadian court with a view to proving that discrimination had taken place. In addition, the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation and W.S.’s estate attempted, on repeated occasions, to remedy, insofar as possible, the injury done to the author through the loss of her property rights. I share the State party’s view that the author has not demonstrated that the offers made to her were not made in good faith or that all of them were insufficient. In particular, the monetary compensation offered in 1999 and 2001 ($15,000 and $20,000, respectively) appears to correspond to the value of the property of which the author was deprived, since Parcel No. 138 was ultimately sold by the estate for $30,000. 22