- 25 45. The Russian Federation further argues that, in order to determine the scope of the ICSFT, the mental elements of the offence of terrorism financing must be defined. The terms “intention” and “knowledge” in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT must therefore be interpreted. The Russian Federation maintains that these two terms are not synonymous. It is of the view that “intention” must be understood as “a specific intent requirement”. Following the interpretation given by the Respondent, “knowledge” refers to actual knowledge that the funds will be used to commit acts of terrorism, and not merely that they may be used to do so. According to the Russian Federation, recklessness is insufficient to establish knowledge. The Russian Federation accepts that the requirement of knowledge can be satisfied by the financing of groups that are notorious terrorist organizations. However, the Respondent argues that it is not sufficient for Ukraine to so characterize any entity unilaterally, particularly in the absence of any indication to that effect by an international organization. 46. The Russian Federation notes that an act constitutes an offence within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1 (a), of the ICSFT when it is “an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex” to the Convention. In this regard, the Respondent submits that in order to constitute an offence defined in Article 1, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done in Montreal on 23 September 1971 (hereinafter the “Montreal Convention”), relied on by Ukraine with regard to the downing of flight MH17, there must be an intent to destroy or cause damage to a civilian aircraft in service. The Russian Federation also provides an interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 1 (b), of the ICSFT, under which acts of terrorism need to be performed with a specific intention and with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government. According to the Respondent, intention under the same subparagraph refers to a “subjective aim, desire or plan” and “implicitly exclud[es] knowledge-based standards”. * 47. Ukraine contends that the Russian Federation’s preliminary objections “improperly ask the Court to address the merits of the Parties’ dispute”. In the Applicant’s view, the Court should not provide a definitive interpretation of Article 2 of the ICSFT at the present stage of the proceedings, nor should it determine the plausibility of the alleged facts before it, but must only decide whether the dispute is one that concerns the interpretation or application of the ICSFT. Ukraine considers that the Russian Federation’s contention that the Court should examine the plausibility of the case is based “on a flawed analogy between preliminary objections and provisional measures”. It argues that the Court, in determining whether it has jurisdiction, must provisionally assume that the facts alleged by Ukraine are true; it must therefore accept them pro tempore. 48. Despite its view that facts should not be assessed in terms of plausibility at the present stage of the proceedings, Ukraine contends that it has “more than plausibly” demonstrated that acts of terrorism within the meaning of the ICSFT have been committed by the Russian Federation’s “proxies” on Ukrainian territory. The Applicant argues that its Memorial contains an “extraordinary level of evidence”.