487. With reference to article 25 of the Covenant, members of the Committee wished to know why certain teachers and journalists were prohibited from becoming founders or members of a political party. 488. Regarding article 27 of the Covenant, members of the Committee wished to receive additional information oil the situation and composition of religious and other minorities in the country. 489. In his reply, the representative of the State party recalled that relations between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were among the most important factors affecting the human rights situation in his country. The adoption of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, as well as the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, had raised hopes of a dialogue between the two sides. In May 1992, three bodies had been established to work on a basic agreement governing unification. The two sides' differences on the nuclear issue had, however, hindered progress in the negotiations. According to his Government, the reunification of the peninsula had to be based on the principles of self-determination, peace and democracy. The other side took a different approach to that issue, and therefore it was difficult to predict the outcome of the current dialogue. It was, however, to be hoped that an agreement would soon be reached on family reunion since, at present, separated family members were still not allowed to telephone or write to one another. 490. The Republic of Korea was still coping with a very real threat of destabilization and military provocation and, until the other side stopped using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy, his country was bound to retain the National Security Law. That law was strictly applied and interpreted in accordance with the Constitution and the Covenant and was only used to counter subversive acts that endangered national security and the democratic order. The substance of a decision of the Constitutional Court of April 1990 which had, inter alia, defined activities "endangering national security and survival" as well as the "basic liberal democratic order" had been incorporated into the National Security Law. It was, therefore, not possible to be convicted under that law simply for expressing communist ideas or for having a positive attitude towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided that those sentiments did not lead to the commission of explicit acts. The concept of espionage covered only information that might jeopardize national security, and it was not invoked unless there had clearly been an attempt to pass information with the knowledge that that information would endanger the Republic of Korea, People had been convicted under the Rational Security Law if they had attempted or advocated the overthrow of the Government by violent means and, in all cases, defendants had enjoyed the full constitutional safeguard that ensured a fair trial. The amendment to the National Security Law was, however, not retroactive and the old law still applied to acts that had taken place before the amendment, 491. Referring to questions relating to the status of the Covenant, the representative of the State party explained that under article 6 of the Constitution the Covenant had the same effect as domestic law. Guarantees contained in the Covenant could, however, not be overturned by subseguent domestic legislation, owing to the Republic of Korea's commitment to human rights and the increasing public awareness of the Covenant, Furthermore, -117-