64 request, the above mentioned Judge of First Instance ordered a new injunction in relation to the pieces of real estate claimed. 91. On the other hand, according to Martin Sanneman’s statement (supra para. 34. f), during a visit he made to the claimed area on April 8, 1994, he was able to ascertain that “around 4,000 meters” measured “from east to west” had been cut and that “it seem[ed] that between 500 and 1,000 meters” measured “from north to south” “had been cleared.” Also, expert witness Andrew Leake pointed out that “deforested areas cover an area of some 2,000 hectares, mostly within the Michi estate;” however, this was “not an exact measurement,” and that “an in situ inspection of the lands is needed.” 92. In view of the foregoing, the Court is unable to determine the exact date on which forest cutting activities were carried out, and therefore, if such activities took place while the injunctions were in force. As a consequence, the Court lacks conclusive elements to determine whether the State ensured enforcement of the judgment entered by the Judge of First Instance through its competent authorities under Article 25(c) of the American Convention. iv) Land claim proceedings 93. In the instant case, there is a discrepancy with respect to the date of commencement of the land claim proceedings. On the one hand, the Inter-American Commission and the representatives state that the proceedings were instituted on August 6, 1991, by means of a notice served by the leaders of the Sawhoyamaxa Community on the IBR, claiming surrender of 8,000 hectares. On the other hand, the State contends that time should be computed from the date the Community obtained its legal personality, i.e. July 21, 1998, and the only actions aimed at enforcing the right to communal property that should be deemed valid are those taken thereafter. 94. To that respect, in the Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, where the State used the same arguments cast in the instant case, the Court stated that: recognition of legal personality allows indigenous communities to enforce their previously existing rights; the same rights they have enjoyed historically and not since their establishment as legal entities. Their political, social, economic, cultural, and religious organization systems, and the rights stemming therefrom, such as the appointment of their own leaders and the right to lay claim to their traditional lands, are recognized, not to the legal entity which has to be registered to fulfill a legal formality, but to the community itself which the very Constitution of Paraguay recognizes as existing prior to the State. Indigenous communities, under Paraguayan laws, are no longer just a factual reality to become legal entities with the capacity to fully enjoy legal rights vested not only in its individual memebers, but in the community itself, that is endowed with its own singular existence. Legal personality is the legal mechanism granting them the necessary status to enjoy certain fundamental rights, such as the right to hold title to communal property and to demand protection against any breach thereof.177 95. The Court finds no grounds to contradict the above mentioned position, therefore, it considers that land claim administrative proceedings were instituted on August 6, 1991. However, taking into account that Paraguay ratified the contentious 177 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 1, paras. 82 y 83.