3 occurred. In the case at hand, the Court has found that the legal proceedings and other measures associated thereto resulted in themselves ineffective or failed to meet the standards of the rule in the Convention as well as those in Article 25 — concerning the prompt recourse for the protection of fundamental rights— and thus ordered, by way of reparation in the broad sense, the adjustment of domestic law so as to provide an effective mechanism for asserting claims and, if it were the case, for laying claim to the ancestral lands of the members of the indigenous groups. II. Claim on lands 10. The infringement of rights of the members of the indigenous communities perpetrated in the context of the infringement of the rights of the communities as such, adopted various forms in history, whether successive or simultaneous, which I have addressed elsewhere. In this connection, I refer to my Opinion accompanying the judgment rendered in the Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua on June 23, 2005, wherein I attempted to establish certain “categories” of violations —whether successive or simultaneous, as stated earlier— committed against such individuals. The most violent and spectacular ones are those falling into the category of physical elimination, which includes some of the events related to the Case of Moiwana Community v. Surinam. Others relate mostly to measures barring the use or enjoyment of property, as in the Cases of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua and of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay. Finally, it is possible to identify hypotheses of “contention", i.e., refusal to recognize and allow the exercise of certain rights, such as were apparent in the Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. 11. In the matter disposed of in the judgment to which I attach this Opinion, the members of an indigenous community were deprived of property they had owned under ancestral title. Once again, the Court has had to look at communal rights from the perspective of individual rights admitted under to Article 1(2) of the American Convention. Hence, the language of the judgment refers to the members of the indigenous groups and not necessarily to the groups collectively. However, the approach in the Convention, which provides grounds for the Court to be seized, does not imply the denial of, or exception against, collective rights. Moreover, it is generally granted —as I myself have done, since my Separate Opinion in the Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community— that individual rights, which constitute human rights under the Pact of San José, originate from, and acquire existence, effectiveness and significance in, the context of collective rights. Therefore, it follows that protecting the former is a way of preserving the latter, and the opposite also stands: protecting collective rights, through the rules and instruments pertaining thereto, helps understand and furthers the preservation of individual rights. Thus, there is no conflict at all, between these two "ways of looking at the status of persons” that strictly complement each other. 12. In this Opinion, I wish to emphasize the nature of the right of the members of the communities —and, in their environment, and to the appropriate extent, of the communities themselves— over the lands that they lawfully claim: ancestral lands they have owned under title predating the forms of land appropriation that came with the empire of conquest and colonization. Even though the Pact of San José does not expressly mention this form of landholding, it was already said in the judgment passed in the Case of Mayagna Community, “through an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights, taking into account