CRPD/C/22/D/18/2013 unfit to stand trial deprived him of the possibility to exercise his legal capacity to answer the charges against him and that this amounts to a violation of article 12 (2) and (3) of the Convention. The Committee recalls that a person’s status as a person with disabilities or the existence of an impairment must never be grounds for denying legal capacity or any of the rights provided for in article 12 21 and that, under article 12 (2), States parties have the obligation to recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. Under article 12 (3), States parties must provide access to the support that persons with disabilities may require to exercise their legal capacity. The Committee also recalls that, under article 13 (1), States parties must ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations. 8.7 In the present case, the decision that the author was unfit to stand trial because of his intellectual and psychosocial impairment resulted in a denial of his right to exercise his legal capacity to plead not guilty and to test the evidence against him. Furthermore, while noting the State party’s argument that the Northern Territory justice system provides people with disabilities the same opportunities as those without disabilities to access services, buildings and facilities, and that the State party is not aware of any requests to support the author’s participation in the proceedings that have been denied, the Committee also notes the author’s statement that the law does not provide for adaptations and adjustments that would enable his culpability for the offences to be determined taking into account his cognitive impairment. The Committee considers that no adequate form of support or accommodation was provided by the State party’s authorities to enable the author to stand trial and exercise legal capacity. He therefore never had the opportunity to have the criminal charges against him determined. The Committee considers that, while States parties have a certain margin of appreciation to determine the procedural arrangements to enable persons with disabilities to exercise their legal capacity, 22 the relevant rights of the person concerned must be respected. That did not happen in the author’s case, as he had no possibility to do so, and was not provided with adequate support or accommodation to exercise his rights to access to justice and a fair trial. In view thereof, the Committee considers that the situation under review amounts to a violation of the author’s rights under articles 12 (2) and (3) and 13 (1) of the Convention. 23 8.8 As to the author’s allegations relating to his detention, the Committee reaffirms that liberty and security of the person is one of the most precious rights to which everyone is entitled. In particular, all persons with disabilities, and especially persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, are entitled to liberty pursuant to article 14 of the Convention.24 In the present case, the Committee notes that, following the Supreme Court decision of 4 December 2007 declaring the author unfit to stand trial, the author was committed to custody in prison following the Supreme Court decision of 22 December 2008. The Committee also notes that justices of the Supreme Court expressed concern about the author’s incarceration in a criminal justice facility, but this decision was adopted because of the lack of available alternatives and support services. The author’s detention was therefore decided on the basis of the assessment by the State party’s authorities of potential consequences of his intellectual disability, in the absence of any criminal conviction, thereby converting his disability into the core cause of his detention. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s detention amounts to a violation of article 14 (1) (b) of the Convention, according to which the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty. 25 8.9 With reference to the author’s allegations under article 15 of the Convention, the Committee emphasizes that States parties are in a special position to safeguard the rights of persons deprived of their liberty owing to the extent of the control that they exercise over 21 22 23 24 25 14 See the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (2014) on equal recognition before the law, para. 9. Jungelin v. Sweden (CRPD/C/12/D/5/2011), para. 10.5. Noble v. Australia, para. 8.6. See paragraph 3 of the Committee’s guidelines on the right to liberty and security of persons with disabilities (A/72/55, annex). See also Noble v. Australia, para. 8.7.