A/HRC/40/58 in articles 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the degree to which they conflate intentional incitement with hostile or violent acts (which States have a duty to prohibit under article 20 (2)) with speech that results in violence against the speaker (such violence would ultimately amount to a “heckler’s veto”). Limitations on freedom of expression that fail to meet the criteria set out in article 19 of the Covenant can, therefore, constitute one of the most serious and frequently encountered obstacles to compliance with the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The present report provides a brief overview of the limitations regime enshrined in the international legal framework on human rights, explores some primary examples of restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression for reasons relating to religion or belief and examines the justifications frequently put forward for imposing them.2 The impact of those limitations on a core aspect of freedom of religion or belief, namely the right of persons to manifest their religion or belief, will be explored by examining cases that are emblematic of the Special Rapporteur’s concern. This focus on victims is consistent with a human rightsbased approach and constitutes an attempt to illustrate the concrete outcomes of the abstract debates to which many involved in this issue have become accustomed. Lastly, the Special Rapporteur recognizes the complexities of the issue at hand and the challenges facing many States as they grapple with the need for thoughtful strategies to address pressing, often emotive situations. The final section of the report, therefore, describes a triage-based approach to tackling tensions often engendered by the competing interests of various stakeholders in a given society, and highlights tools developed under various United Nations initiatives to guide and assist States in their efforts. 13. III. International human rights framework 14. Freedom of expression is necessary for the meaningful enjoyment of the freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The protections of those freedoms are formulated in analogous ways.3 One cannot be fully enjoyed without the other or in the absence of the right to privacy, freedom of association and peaceful assembly. This suggests that the two rights are not only interdependent, but also exist in a legal continuum with myriad other rights.4 Accordingly, it is more appropriate to view the relationship between these rights as being mutually reinforcing, rather than one of tension or hierarchy. Often, however, these two freedoms are viewed as having a competitive relationship, and many States seek to “balance” these two rights, with freedom of religion or belief appearing to emerge as the victor in some parts of the world, and freedom of expression in others. In cases of the former, alarm among accountability and enforcement mechanisms often arises over encroachments on freedom of expression and an ensuing crescendo of negative implications for other rights. Opponents of widening the scope for limits on speech involving religion or belief beyond those stipulated in articles 18 (3), 19 (3) and 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights often criticize limits for their vagueness, draconian penalties and frequency of use (and misuse); in stark contrast to the narrow confines for limits on the freedoms of expression and religion or belief stipulated by international human rights law. They call attention to international law, which stipulates that human beings are rights holders who may hold, adopt or change their religion or beliefs as they wish without fear of being subject to discrimination, hostility, or violence for holding said religions or beliefs. However, religions or beliefs per se are not immune from criticism, rejection or insult to the extent that those do not impair the right of individuals to have or to adopt a belief of their choice (A/HRC/2/3, para. 37). 15. 2 3 4 4 The present report does not cover restrictions imposed on religious expression in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others (such as homophobic and misogynist speech); those will be examined in a future report. There are differences, however. The expression of views relating to religion or belief may not be restricted on grounds of national security, whereas freedom of expression may. Malcolm D. Evans, “The freedom of religion or belief and the freedom of expression”, Religion and Human Rights, vol. 4, Nos. 2–3 (2009), p. 206.