A/69/261 purposes according to the understanding in article 18, paragr aph 3, of the Covenant, inter alia, depend on the raison d’être of the employing institution and on the specific purpose and nature of the employment. For instance, the purpose of employment in the public service may differ significantly from employment wi thin a private company, and such differences could possibly become an argument for imposing different rules of conduct in respective public or private employment contracts. However, any stipulations negatively affecting freedom of religion or belief must be precisely and narrowly defined. Limitations must always clearly relate to one of the legitimate purposes enumerated in article 18, paragraph 3, of the Covenant; they must furthermore be necessary to pursue the stated purpose; and they must be enacted without any discriminatory intention or effect. 39. In this context, the Special Rapporteur would like to again acknowledge the work carried out by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which engages in a process of ongoing dialogue with Governments on the application of ratified conventions, helping to identify information gaps and suggesting measures and mechanisms for improved implementation. In its Observations and Direct Requests, ILO can also take into account information from other United Nations supervisory bodies, forums and agencies. When monitoring ILO Convention No. 111, the Committee of Experts has always insisted on a narrow understanding of article 1, paragraph 2, which states: “Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect to a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.” According to the Committee of Experts, “the concept of inherent requirements must be interpreted restrictively so as to avoid undue limitations of the protection that the Convention is intended to provide”. 14 40. The Special Rapporteur has gained the impression that restrictions imposed on religious manifestations at the workplace frequently fail to satisfy the criteria se t out in relevant international human rights instruments. This critical assessment covers both public employers and the private sector. Limitations are often overly broad; it remains unclear which precise purpose they are supposed to serve and whether the purpose is important enough to justify infringements on an employee’s right to freedom of religion or belief. The requirement always to minimize interferences to what is clearly “necessary” in order to achieve a legitimate purpose, as implied in the proportionality test, is frequently ignored. Moreover, restrictions are sometimes applied in a discriminatory manner. Indeed, many employers appear to lack awareness that they may incur serious human rights problems as a result of restricting manifestations of freedom of religion or belief by their staff. Under international human rights law, States — in cooperation with other stakeholders — have a joint responsibility to rectify this state of affairs. 41. It should be noted in this context that religious instit utions constitute a special category, as their raison d’être is, from the outset, a religious one. Freedom of religion or belief also includes the right to establish a religious infrastructure which is needed to organize and maintain important aspects of r eligious community life. __________________ 14 14-58756 See, for example, the Committee’s observation concerning Australia (adopted in 2013), which refers to the International Labour Conference General Survey on fundamental Conventions on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at work in light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008 (ILC.101/III/1B), para. 827. 11/23