A/69/261 relate to specific religious spaces and institutions, the terms “observance” and “practice” do not display any spatial or institutional specificities and must be broadly applied. The text also clearly states that the right to manifest one’s r eligion or belief spans both private and public aspects of human life. In addition, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 1981 (General Assembly resolution 36/55) clarifies, in article 4, paragraph 1, that the responsibility of States to combat religious discrimination covers “all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life”. Thus, there can be no reasonable doubt that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief also applies in the workplace. 32. The second general misunderstanding is more difficult to refute. It rests on the assumption that by voluntarily signing a labour contract, employees large ly waive their freedom of religion or belief, which they, supposedly, can fully retrieve by abandoning their employment and taking an alternative job that accommodates their religious needs and convictions. In other words, the voluntary nature of an employment relationship is used as an argument to deny any interference with the right of freedom of religion or belief and refute the possibility that serious issues of religious freedom at the workplace can emerge as long as the complainant could take steps to avoid the limitation, such as finding another job. Although in practice this may hold true in some cases, the overall reasoning remains highly problematic on a number of accounts. It is true that there is an option for the employer to define certain work-related obligations which may actually limit an employee’s freedom to manifest her/his religion or belief. The scope of such limitations, inter alia, depends on the (public, private, religious, secular, etc.) characteristics of the employing institution, as well as on the particular purpose of the employment. However, limitations of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, if defined in a labour contract, must always be specific, compatible with the nature of the task to be accomplished and proportionate to a legitimate purpose. They can never amount to a simple waiver of the employee’s freedom of religion or belief, which after all, enjoys the elevated status of an “inalienable” human right. Moreover, one should take into consideration that some employees may, in reality, have little option to find alternative employment. Pointing to the “voluntary” nature of an employment contract and the hypothetical option of leaving the existing contract can thus be unrealistic, depending on the specific situation. Instead, the factual availability, or non-availability, of alternative employment can be an important empirical factor in assessing the proportionality of specific contract-based limitations on freedom of religion or belief. 2. Criteria for limitations imposed on freedom of religion or belief 33. Imposing limitations on the exercise of any right to freedom is always sensitive. On the one hand, it is a truism that neither the freedom of an individual, nor that of a group, can be completely unlimited, since making use of one’s own freedom might negatively affect the rights of other people or important public interests. On the other hand, the general need for some limitations can easily become a pretext for imposing arbitrary, discriminatory or overly b road restrictions. Countless examples demonstrate that this also happens in the area of freedom of religion or belief. The question of where to draw limits and how to prevent the abuse of limitation clauses therefore requires caution and diligence. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights outlines some indispensable 14-58756 9/23