that they were illegally dispossessed of the land subleased to RIVNAC and that only indigenous tribunals are competent to hear their complaint, it notes that no French tribunal has at any moment been seized of any of the claims formulated by Messrs. Hopu and Bessert. Thus, they could have, at the time of the sale of the contested grounds and of the proceedings leading to the judgment of the Tribunal of Papeete of 6 October 1961, challenged the legality of the procedure initiated or else the competence of the tribunal. Any decision made on such a challenge would have been susceptible of appeal. However, the judgment of 6 October 1961 was never challenged, and therefore has become final. 5.3 Furthermore, at the time of the occupation of the grounds in 1992-1993, it was fully open to the authors, according to the State party, to intervene in the proceedings between RIVNAC and the Association "IA ORA O NU'UROA". This procedure, known as "tierce opposition", enables every individual to oppose a judgment which affects/infringes his or her rights, even if he/she is not a party to the proceedings. The procedure of "tierce opposition" is governed by articles 218 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of French Polynesia. The State party notes that the authors could have intervened ("... auraient pu former tierce opposition") both against the decision of the Tribunal of First Instance of Papeete and the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Papeete, by challenging the title of RIVNAC to the contested grounds and by refuting the competence of these courts. 5.4 The State party emphasizes that the competence of a tribunal can always be challenged by a complainant. Article 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure of French Polynesia stipulates that a complainant challenging the jurisdiction of the court must indicate the jurisdiction he considers to be competent ("s'il est prétendu que la juridiction saisie est incompétente..., la partie qui soulève cette exception doit faire connaître en même temps et à peine d'irrecevabilité devant quelle juridiction elle demande que l'affaire soit portée"). 5.5 According to the State party, the authors could equally, in the context of "tierce opposition", have argued that the expulsion from the grounds claimed by RIVNAC constituted a violation of their right to privacy and their right to a family life. The State party recalls that the provisions of the Covenant are directly applicable before French tribunals; articles 17 and 23 could well have been invoked in the present case. In respect of the claims under articles 17 and 23, paragraph 1, therefore, the State party also argues that domestic remedies have not been exhausted. 5.6 Finally, the State party argues that judicial decisions made in the context of "tierce opposition" proceedings can be appealed in the same way as judgments of the same court ("... les jugements rendus sur tierce opposition sont susceptibles des mêmes recours que les décisions de la juridiction dont ils émanent"). If the authors had challenged the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Papeete of 29 April 1993 on the basis of "tierce opposition", any decision adopted in respect of their challenge could have been appealed to the Court of Cassation. In this context, the State party notes that pursuant to article 55 of the French Constitution of 4 June 1958, the Covenant provisions are incorporated into the French legal order and are given priority over