A/76/380 International Studies of the City University of New York on a follow -up project arising from his visit to Uzbekistan. As an observer, he attended meetings of the International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief and of the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance. He also continued to engage various actors promoting freedom of religion or belief, including the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Minority Rights Group. III. Methodology 9. To inform the present report, the Special Rapporteur held 7 online round -table consultations and 11 online bilateral meetings with key stakeholders from all five geographical regions. In response to his call for submissions, he received and reviewed submissions from 35 civil society entities, 14 individuals, 12 States, 4 multilateral organizations and 3 national human rights and equality bodies. Reflecting diverse and multifaceted interests in the fre edom of thought, participants included rights holders; human rights defenders; civil society; leaders of all faiths and none; psychologists; neuroscientists; policymakers; lawyers; scholars; the media; digital technology companies; intergovernmental and international organizations; and States. The Special Rapporteur extends his deepest gratitude to all who provided their time and insights. IV. Conceptual framework 10. International law does not define “thought”. The travaux préparatoires for article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 14 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 14 are silent on the concept. Some claim that the drafters purposefully left its meaning vague so that our understanding of the right could evolve with scientific developments. Consequently, scholars intensely debate how narrowly to interpret the concept of “thought” in international human rights law and, therefore, the scope of protection afforded to “freedom of thought”. 11. What constitutes “thought” not only lacks legal precision, but also scientific and philosophical consensus. Neuroscientists generally agree that thoughts are created when billions of neurons (nerve cells) in the brain – connected by trillions of synapses – fire together.15 But the consensus ends there. Some neuroscientists distinguish “thought” from other cognitive processes, including emotion, based on the primary part of the brain engaged. Others emphasize the complex, highly interrelated nature of anatomical aspects of the brain that support cognitive functions, comparing efforts to “trace a thought from beginning to end” to “asking where the forest begins”. 16 12. Many stakeholders treat “thought” as an individual process and/or product of thinking. 17 For instance, legal scholar Nita Farahany considers “thought” as a cognitive “product” with “rich” or “substantive” content, thereby distinguishing it from “lower” outcomes of cognition including emotions, inclinations or preferences. 18 Others reject this conceptual distinction, asserting that emotions are an __________________ 14 15 16 17 18 21-14191 E/CN.4/1984/71, paras. 13–33. See https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mind-aglow-scientists-watch-thoughts-form-inthe-brain/. See https://engineering.mit.edu/engage/ask-an-engineer/what-are-thoughts-made-of/. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/thought; and submissions from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and from Jan Christoph Bublitz. Consultation on psychology and neuroscience. 5/28