A/73/362 conflict, used to legitimize wars of conquest and to perpetuate deplorable acts of disregard for equality and basic respect for human dignity. Most recently, massacres, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide have been carried out either in the name of religion or as a result of the victims’ religious identity. 29. Religion or belief can generally be implicated in violent extremism in two ways. First is the use of violence in the name of religion, either in a targeted or indiscriminate manner. This may include coercive acts in, or related to, the private sphere, such as “honour” killings. Second is a recourse to violence as a manifestation of collective religious hatred against persons targeted because of their religious or belief identity. In practice, the two kinds of violence fr equently overlap. 30. Violence in the name of religion or belief is perpetrated by way of indiscriminate or targeted attacks on individuals or communities. They involve suicide attacks, repression and other forms of institutional and structural violence. T he majority of these acts target local persons or institutions, but it has become increasingly commonplace in recent years to use violence in the name of religion or belief in local, everyday places of daily life to send messages around the world (see A/HRC/28/66). 31. In some countries, armed groups invoke religion to justify atrocities such as targeted mass killings, extrajudicial and summary executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, indiscriminate attacks against civilians, mass expulsions, enslavement or the systematic destruction of certain communities. In other countries, vigilante groups harass religious or belief minorities by vandalizing cemeteries and places of worship, grabbing l ands or properties and threatening their security (see A/68/268 and A/HRC/22/51). 32. To be clear, violent extremism is not confined to any particular religion or region; many religions have been invoked by State and non-State actors, in both the global north and the global south, to justify violence in its various forms. Acts of violent extremism might also be carried out with equal vigour in the name of left - and right-wing or other political ideologies whose followers steadfastly adhere to extremist violence to advance non-religious, atheist and secular political agendas. These actors have historically sought to exploit weak Governments and fractious conditions by capitalizing on people’s sense of grievance — real or perceived — to galvanize them towards supporting or perpetrating violent acts. 33. Those targeted by advocates of violence see violent extremism as a means to better address their grievances or meet other needs based on their formative and everyday experiences. However, the path whereby an individual comes to perceive terrorist violence as a possible course of action is unclear. Studies undertaken so far demonstrate that, despite an identifiable set of common “push” and “pull” factors, the pathways from holding extreme views that lead to carrying out acts of terrorism are non-linear and unpredictable, and “triggers” of violent action are individualized (see A/HRC/31/65). 34. Moreover, the particular identity of these actors is neither emblematic of violent extremism nor does it define the nature of the ideology the perpetrators claim to espouse, even if that ideology may be considered radical. In addition, th e fact that some individuals incite discrimination, hostility or violence is not an indication that a religious or belief community shares these views or condones violent activities. In this regard, as already noted, the acts of individual members of relig ious communities should be associated with the person in question rather than with the community and other members generally. 35. Violence in the name of religion or belief predominantly targets persons belonging to religious or belief minorities, including converts, humanists, atheists and agnostics who suffer from a climate of intimidation, rep ression or violence, globally 10/22 18-14697