affected community,328 whereas in case of large-scale developments indigenous peoples have a right to free, prior and informed consent.329 Two points should be made here.330 First, the IACtHR described large-scale developments only in terms of their potential impact, noting that they would normally have significant negative effects on the environment and life of the indigenous groups concerned. This raises the question, though, whether several small(er)-scale projects may have equally serious effects.331 Second, the IACtHR’s reasoning suggests that the right to free, prior and informed consent actually entails a right to veto. If this were not the case, the promotion of two different regimes with respect to small- and large-scale developments would be of little use, as in both cases indigenous peoples would lack the legal basis to obtain the suspension or termination of the relevant project. This approach breaks new ground, since no indigenous consent is upheld by ILO Convention No. 169, and the UNDRIP is at best ambiguous over the matter.332 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) within the framework of the ICERD did embrace such consent in its General Recommendation No. 23 of 1997. The CERD stressed that states are requested to: ‘ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent’.333 In the light of the above, a judgment on a case concerning large-scale developments would certainly shed further light on such issues. In a similar vein, the IACHR has embraced the basic principle that states have the obligation to consult indigenous peoples and provide all necessary information prior to making any decisions which may affect indigenous peoples’ traditional lands.334 The IACHR has also stressed the need for indigenous peoples’ informed consent in connection with the implementation of projects for the exploitation of natural resources,335 and required the involvement of indigenous peoples’ representative institutions in the consultation procedures.336 Finally, it has referred to indigenous peoples’ participation in the benefits flowing from the realization of these activities.337 However, further developments should be sought with regard to the consultation procedures, especially as regards the role of indigenous peoples’ representative authorities and traditional decision-making frameworks. Crucially, the implications of the requirement for indigenous peoples’ informed consent do not seem to have been fully explored by the IACHR. The International Labour Organization ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) ILO Convention No. 169 is currently the only binding instrument still open to ratification setting out indigenous peoples’ rights.338 Adopted on 27 June 1989 and having entered into force on 5 September 1991, the Convention has so far been ratified by 20 states.339 Like any other ILO Convention, it is subject to the ILO supervisory system, relying on a regular monitoring procedure and some special procedures.340 In particular, it is worth briefly recalling the procedures regulated by Articles 22 and 24 ff. Article 22 of the ILO Constitution requires that states submit reports on the implementation of ratified conventions at regular intervals. These intervals are every one to five years depending on the Convention concerned and on whether problems have arisen in its implementation. Under Article 23 of the Constitution, workers’ and employers’ organizations can provide their observations on the implementation of ratified Conventions. The reports submitted by states and the observations of the social partners are then examined by a committee composed of independent experts, that is, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (hereinafter CEACR), which will comment on states’ compliance with its obligations under a Convention by means of ‘observations’ and ‘direct requests’. As to Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, this article enables any workers’ and employers’ organization, whether international or national, to make a representation to the ILO alleging the failure of a member state to abide by certain provisions contained in a ratified Convention. NGOs cannot have access to ILO procedures. Therefore, unless special mechanisms are set up at national level (see, for example, the involvement of the Sami parliament in the regular monitoring procedure through the submission of comments on the reports of Norway), indigenous peoples’ and minorities’ concerns can only be voiced through the ILO constituents, notably workers’ and employers’ organizations. These latter can, for instance, incorporate the information submitted to them by indigenous peoples in their observations on the implementation of the Convention submitted under Article 23 of the ILO Constitution. Indigenous peoples’ land rights under ILO Convention No. 169 After acknowledging in Article 13 the special importance that indigenous peoples’ relationship to land has for their MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 33