case, first the Chamber (unanimously) and then the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (16 votes to 1) found that the applicant’s right to manifest her religion was violated under Article 9(1) ECHR; however, the interference with her right was justified under Article 9(2), because it was in accordance with law, ‘pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order’,66 and necessary in a democratic society where several religions coexist within one society; hence, restrictions may be placed on ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected’.67 The rationale behind this conclusion was that in the secular Muslim-majority Turkey, a mere wearing of the headscarf was capable of a proselytizing effect. The Court accepted Turkey’s justifications based on the principles of secularism and gender equality, and found that the interference with the applicant’s freedom to manifest religious symbols in public space was justified. Only Judge Tulkens dissented from the majority decision in the Grand Chamber. She argued that the interference could not be justified under Article 9(2) ECHR, because it was not necessary in a democratic society. Where gender equality is concerned, she was unable to see ‘how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted’. Moreover, the ECtHR granted too wide a margin of appreciation to Turkey, because similar disputes, contesting the right to manifest a religion, came before the courts in several European states; so this was no longer a local matter and there was a need for European supervision. In their reasoning in Şahin, the majority of judges heavily relied on Karaduman v Turkey 68 and Dahlab v Switzerland.69 In Karaduman v Turkey, the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) found that there was no interference with Article 9(1) ECHR. The case concerned a Muslim student who could not receive her degree certificate for two years because she refused to supply an identity photograph showing her bare-headed, which she claimed was contrary to her religious beliefs. The applicant further complained that the authorities discriminated between females of foreign and Turkish nationality, because the restriction did not affect female foreign nationals who had total freedom as to how to dress in Turkish universities. The ECmHR ruled that because the purpose of the photograph was to identify the person concerned, it could not be used by an individual to manifest one’s religious beliefs; hence, Article 9(1) ECHR did not apply to this situation. Furthermore, the ECmHR refused to deal with the applicant’s claim under Article 14 ECHR, because she had not exhausted domestic remedies; according to the ECmHR, this argument was not raised before a national court. Dahlab v Switzerland concerned a school teacher’s complaint that, by dismissing her from her job for wearing a headscarf, the state interfered with her freedom of religion. Furthermore, she alleged that the prohibition imposed by the Swiss authorities amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR, ‘in that a man belonging to the Muslim faith could teach at a State school without being subject to any form of prohibition’. The ECtHR found the application inadmissible because this interference was necessary in a democratic society and justified under Article 9(2) on the grounds of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety, because Ms Dahlab taught very young children who could be easily influenced by such a manifestation. However, even assuming that the restrictions on the rights of Ms Dahlab were legitimate,70 despite the fact that there were no complaints from children or their parents, this case should be distinguished from Karaduman and Şahin because, as a teacher, Ms Dahlab represented the state and was in a position of authority in relation to the very young children, aged 4 to 8, she taught. This conclusion stems from the ECtHR’s case law concerning proselytism, where the ECtHR established the significance of the superior position of a proselytizer. Thus, in Kokkinakis v Greece,71 the applicant’s conviction for proselytizing others was found to infringe his rights under Article 9 ECHR. In contrast, in the case of Lariss v Greece,72 the applicant was convicted of proselytism. The ECtHR found that since Mr Lariss was an officer and therefore a superior in the Greek army, his conviction for seeking to proselytize his subordinates should be upheld. Hence, there was no violation of Article 9. Similarly, in Delgado Paez,73 the UN HRC found that the dismissal of a teacher of religion and ethics for advocating his own views on religion among pupils did not violate Article 18 ICCPR, because he used his superior position to influence children’s religious views. Accordingly, even if the ECtHR could find an element of superior position in Dahlab (if not indoctrination) and, hence, accept Switzerland’s justifications under Article 9(2), this was not a case in Karaduman and Şahin concerning university students: clearly, the applicants were not in a position of authority towards their peers and did not represent the state. Moreover, the arguments drawing on the distinction between the state’s secularity as a political principle of government policy and an individual’s wearing of symbols to take part in a religious practice which does not infringe upon the state’s secularity,74 was not accepted in the ECHR institutions. MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 9