International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.281 The ECtHR noted that the exclusion of the applicants from standing for elections pursued a legitimate aim of restoring peace which was broadly compatible with the general objectives of the ECHR as reflected in its Preamble.282 This was so because at the time of enacting the impugned constitutional provisions, a very fragile ceasefire had been achieved on the ground. The provisions aimed to end a brutal conflict which led to ‘ethnic cleansing’. To ensure peace, it was necessary to acquire the approval of ‘constituent peoples’. This explained, though it did not justify, the exclusion of other communities from standing for elections. However, in light of recent developments, the maintenance of the system did not satisfy the requirement of proportionality, based on the reasons discussed below. First, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly developed since the Dayton Peace Agreement. The state joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006, signed and ratified a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 2008, successfully amended its Constitution in 2009 and recently has been elected as a member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term. Furthermore, preparations are under way for the closure of an international administration as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the aim of restoring peace is not as pressing as when the Dayton Agreement was concluded. Second, even though the ECHR does not prescribe a particular electoral system, there exist mechanisms of power-sharing which do not automatically lead to the total exclusion of persons belonging to the 23 legally recognized national minorities or a person who does not want to identify him or herself as exclusively Bosniak, Croat or Serb or who refuses to identify him or herself for whatever reason, as the Opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) illustrate.283 Accordingly, there is the possibility of achieving the same end by using alternative means.284 For example, the Venice Commission commented on several proposals285 which could address the exclusion of minorities from standing for elections, including indirect elections for the collective presidency with the view of moving towards a single president in a manner which ensured trust beyond the ethnic group to which he or she belongs.286 Finally, as a member of the Council of Europe and a candidate for EU membership, Bosnia and Herzegovina has voluntarily assumed certain obligations. Thus, by ratifying the ECHR and its Protocols, the state agreed to meet the relevant standards. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina committed itself, within one year of its 28 accession, to review (with the assistance of the Venice Commission) its electoral legislation and revise it where necessary to comply with the Council of Europe standards which inter alia include respect for minority rights. This commitment is reaffirmed in the 2008 Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.287 Based on these considerations, the ECtHR concluded that the applicants’ continued ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina lacked an objective and reasonable justification and constituted a breach of Article 14 taken together with Article 3 of Protocol 1. In addition, the ECtHR found that an identical constitutional precondition concerning eligibility to stand for elections to the Presidency violated Article 1 of Protocol 12. The case advances the right of minorities to political participation in several respects. First, as discussed in the section on non-discrimination, Article 1 of Protocol 12 widens the application of the principle of non-discrimination; in this case it condemned discrimination against minorities in political participation not only in the elected legislature, that is, the right protected under Article 3 of Protocol 1, but also in other bodies, such as the presidency.288 Moreover, the ECtHR granted the state only a narrow margin of discretion, despite the government’s suggestion that the ECtHR follow Ždanoka v Latvia in order to reaffirm the states’ considerable latitude in establishing electoral systems within their constitutional order and to distinguish the case from Aziz v Cyprus, because minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been prevented from standing for elections in all bodies. Furthermore, despite Judge Bonello’s strong criticism,289 the ECtHR was not influenced by historic and political circumstances leading to the establishment of the current electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina; instead, it focused on the state’s firm commitments to review its electoral legislation and guarantee political participation of minorities in line with Council of Europe standards. Accordingly, the potential of the principle of nondiscrimination to ensure effective participation of minorities in the political life of states is becoming increasingly significant. These developments may bring the ECtHR’s case law in line with the jurisprudence of other international and regional quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, the HRC has been more generous than the ECtHR in its interpretation of the right to stand for elections by requiring states to avoid excluding persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as descent, or by reason of political affiliation.290 Likewise, in Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia 291 the ACHPR was less forgiving of MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE