of Protocol 1: the reason for applying different systems was the protection of the rights of a minority, and was, hence, justified. The ECmHR developed this approach further in Moureaux v Belgium 252 by emphasizing that states may be obliged to take account of the special position of minorities when electors choose candidates based on their belonging to an ethnic or linguistic group. Another way to protect minority groups may be the introduction of a residence requirement aimed to limit political participation of persons who do not have sufficiently strong links with the territory or a minority group. Thus, in Marie-Hélène Gillot v France 253 and Py v France,254 both the HRC and the ECtHR found that the 10-year period of residence requirement to qualify for voting in New Caledonia was compatible with the right to vote under the ICCPR and the ECHR. Given that the residence requirement was introduced in the context of self-determination of New Caledonia’s population, it was not unreasonable to limit participation in local referenda and elections to individuals who have sufficiently strong ties with the territory and are directly concerned by the future of New Caledonia.255 Similarly, in Nicoletta Polacco and Alessandro Garofalo v Italy 256 the ECmHR found that a four-year residence requirement to vote in elections in Trento was legitimate, because Italy introduced this condition to protect the rights of the German and Ladin minorities in the region of Trentino Alto-Adige. The requirement aimed to ensure that individuals taking part in elections are reasonably aware of the social, political and economic context of the region. This, in the ECmHR’s view, was necessary in order ‘for the elector to have a thorough understanding of the regional context, so that his vote in the local elections can reflect the concern for the protection of the linguistic minorities’;257 hence, the measure was proportionate. Right to stand for elections International instruments do not impose on states any particular electoral system. However, they require states to guarantee the free expression of the electorate. In particular, the drawing of electoral boundaries and allocation of votes ‘should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely’.258 Moreover, states should avoid disadvantaging national minorities by introducing changes to the administrative structures of a country.259 Thus, in Istvan Matyus v Slovakia,260 the applicant complained that the number of residents per representative in five voting districts in the town of RoñÁava was not proportional. Thus, there was ‘one representative per 1,000 residents in district number one; one per 800 residents in district number two; one per 1,400 residents in district 26 number three; one per 200 residents in district number four; and one per 200 residents in district number five’.261 Consequently, the last two districts were better represented in the elections. As a candidate in voting district number three, the applicant claimed that his right to political participation was violated because he was not given an equal opportunity to exercise his right to be elected to posts in the town council. In its decision on this case, the Constitutional Court of Slovakia established that, by drawing election districts for the same municipal council with substantial differences between the number of inhabitants per elected representative, Slovakia acted contrary to the election law specifically requiring proportional representation of inhabitants in voting districts and the Constitutional provision on equality of voting rights. However, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint of Mr Matyus because he complained after the election: declaring the election invalid could have interfered with the rights of elected representatives who acquired their positions in good faith.262 In assessing this claim under Article 25 ICCPR, the HRC, taking note of the Constitutional Court’s pronouncement and the fact that Slovakia failed to explain the differences in the number of representatives per districts, found a violation of Article 25 (a) and (c) ICCPR. Generally, when minorities’ access to standing for elections was barred without sufficient procedural guarantees, the international courts did not hesitate to find a violation. For example, in Antonina Ignatane v Latvia 263 and Podkolzina v Latvia 264 both the HRC and the ECtHR found that Latvia breached the applicants’ right to stand for elections. In both cases, although the applicants successfully passed language aptitude tests, they were subjected to additional verification of language skills without sufficient procedural safeguards. Thus, the full responsibility in the assessment of the applicants’ language proficiency was ‘left to a single civil servant, who had exorbitant power in the matter’.265 This procedural aspect of the case was decisive in finding a violation. In addition to procedural guarantees, the state must ensure judicial review of acts which may limit the right to stand for elections. In Susana Higuchi Miyagawa v Peru, the IACtHR found that Peru violated Article 23 of the ACHR. The applicant was prevented from standing for elections, because the National Electoral Board invalidated the applicant’s registration due to typographical errors detected in the list.266 Significantly, the decisions of the National Electoral Board were not subject to review. The IACtHR found that Peru was obliged to guarantee effective remedies to review its acts which may violate political rights as protected under Article 23 ACHR.267 Moreover, states should not unreasonably limit the right of persons to stand for election by requiring MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE