on an identifiable complainant who claims to be a victim:169 the scope of the Race Directive would be limited if it only applied to ‘those cases in which an unsuccessful candidate for a post, considering himself to be the victim of direct discrimination, brought legal proceedings against the employer’.170 The ECJ ruled that an employer’s public statements in the context of a recruitment drive, stating that applications from persons of a certain ethnic origin would be turned down, amounted to direct discrimination under the Race Directive, because they were likely to hinder access to the labour market by dissuading certain candidates from applying for advertised positions. The ECJ’s ruling in the case suggests that the Court accords high scrutiny to cases involving discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. This view may be also supported by the fact that in Feryn, neither the ECJ nor the Advocate General discussed a possibility that, in some exceptional cases, genuine and determining occupational requirements171 may require an employer to differentiate between the applicants. Although such discussion might have been unnecessary in the context of Feryn, this approach may also be indicative of the ECJ’s intention to interpret exceptions under the Race Directive very narrowly. Employment Directive: religion or belief To date, the ECJ has not considered a case concerning religious discrimination based on the Employment Directive.172 Arguably, in addition to the Employment Directive, the Race Directive may indirectly protect those minorities who share both an ethnic origin and a religion. Three aspects of the Equality Directives which may affect future case law in this field should be mentioned. First, the Race Directive is more rigorous than the Employment Directive and requires member states to protect racial and ethnic groups in employment, vocational training, education and provision of goods and services in both public and private spheres, whereas the Employment Directive applies only to employment relations. Thus, there is a notable hierarchy of the grounds under the Equality Directives, with race or ethnic origin accorded the highest level of protection, followed by gender, while religion is at the bottom of the hierarchy. This hierarchy stems from the different scopes of protection accorded under the Race, the Employment and the Goods and Services Directives, as discussed above. Recently, the Commission proposed to expand the scope of the Employment Directive to match the Race Directive.173 If this proposal is accepted, the Employment Directive would apply not only to employment and occupation, but also to the provision of goods and services, including education in both public and private spheres. Furthermore, under the Race Directive some groups which share both a common race and common religion may receive more extensive (indirect) protection, while others who share only a religion may be excluded. Arguably, it is often difficult to delimit race and religion, which may prove problematic in the application of the Race and the Employment Directives, particularly where ‘a religion can be linked to ethnicity, either because a religious group is considered to have an ethnic character, or because members of a religion belong predominantly to particular ethnic groups’.174 In this respect, the UK’s experience is highly relevant, because the Race Directive was modelled on the Race Relations Act (1976); hence, similar to the British experience, some groups which have both a common ethnic origin and a common religion, such as Sikhs, Gypsies and Jews,175 may benefit from the Race Directive, while others, who share only religion, such as Muslims, Rastafarians and Jehovah’s Witnesses,176 may be excluded. Accordingly, indirect protection of some religious minorities which also share a common ethnic origin under the Race Directive might generate an imbalance in the protection of religious minorities. In addition, based on Article 4(2), which permits a specific exception to the principle of equal treatment in the case of churches and other organizations with an ethos based on religion or belief, employers may choose a ‘person of the same religion or belief for a job where being of that religion or belief is a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement’. This provision may permit, for example, a church to advertise for a ‘committed Christian’ to take a position as the Minister of the Church. However, when transposing the Directive into their national laws, some member states have provided ‘exceptions that may go beyond the strict terms of the Directive or which remain ambiguous’.177 Moreover, the Employment Directive establishes in Article 2(5) that the instrument is without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which ‘in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. This limitation, which replicates Article 9(2) ECHR, may further curtail the scope of rights of religions minorities under the Directive. Another problem in the application of the Employment Directive may stem from a lack of a definition of the terms ‘religion’ or ‘belief ’ in the majority of member states. Arguably, it is often difficult to delimit race and religion, which may prove problematic in the application of the Race and the Employment Directives, particularly where ‘a religion can be linked to ethnicity, either because a religious group is considered to have an MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 17