In its assessment, the ECtHR emphasized that ‘[d]iscrimination on account of one’s actual or perceived ethnicity is a form of racial discrimination’115 and it is the duty of the authorities to investigate such cases with special vigilance. Noting that the respondent state failed to present plausible explanation of differential treatment based on ethnic origin, the ECtHR stated that: ‘[i]n any event, the Court considers that no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures.’ 116 In this passage the ECtHR effectively indicates that in a democratic society justification of a difference in treatment on the basis of race may not be acceptable. Such an approach indicates that the ECtHR is likely to adopt a high level of scrutiny in cases involving racial discrimination. This is not to say that special measures 117 based on race and ethnicity, specifically designed to ensure substantive equality of a racial or ethnic group could not lead to differential treatment.118 The ECtHR has long established that not every differential treatment results in discrimination;119 in addition, there may be a state duty to differentiate in order to protect minorities.120 Accordingly, the ECtHR adopts a high level of scrutiny in its case law on racial and ethnic discrimination. The cases of Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina,121 decided by the Grand Chamber on 22 December 2009, confirmed this trend. It is noteworthy that Minority Rights Group International (MRG) advised and represented Mr Finci throughout the proceedings. The cases concern discrimination against persons belonging to minorities, who are excluded from effective participation in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on their ethnic origin. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 ECHR read together with Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR. Significantly, the ECtHR established that, notwithstanding the difference in scope between Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR and Article 14 ECHR, the meaning of non-discrimination in these articles was intended to be identical, as clarified in paragraph 18 of the Explanatory Report to Protocol 12.122 Because in assessing nondiscrimination under Protocol 12 the ECtHR relied on its reasoning under Article 14 ECHR, it may be useful to overview the Court’s analysis in more detail. In assessing the state’s compliance with Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol 1, the ECtHR reiterated that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations. ‘No objective and reasonable justification’, in the ECtHR’s view, ‘means that the distinction in question does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or that there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized”’.123 Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, the subject matter and the background, states may have varying degrees of margin of discretion. Where the ground of discrimination based on ethnicity and race is concerned, the ECtHR reaffirmed that discrimination based on a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination; as a particularly egregious kind of discrimination, racial discrimination requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction.124 In view of its perilous consequences, in cases involving a difference in treatment based on race or ethnicity, ‘objective and reasonable justification’ must be construed as strictly as possible.125 Moreover, no difference in treatment exclusively or primarily based on a person’s ethnic origin can be objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society based on the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity. That being said, Article 14 does not preclude states from treating groups differently to correct ‘factual inequalities’ between them; moreover, in some situations a failure to attempt to correct inequality may violate this provision, unless there is an objective and reasonable justification.126 Accordingly, the ECtHR has not deviated from its previous jurisprudence on Article 14 and has reaffirmed the principles established in its case law. In applying these principles to the present case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 ECHR read in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol 1. So far, we have overviewed the general principles in the ECtHR’s assessment of non-discrimination. The ECtHR’s reasoning on non-discrimination in political participation in the context of the present case is discussed in more detail on pages 27–28 of this guide. We now turn to the ECtHR’s construal of nondiscrimination under Protocol 12. The applicants in Sejdić and Finci complained that under the constitutional provisions they were ineligible to stand for election to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because this was a right set forth by law, irrespective of whether elections to the Presidency fell within the ambit of Article 3 of Protocol 1, Article 1 of Protocol 12 applied to the case. In its assessment, the Court referred to its reasoning under Article 14 ECHR, considered that there was no pertinent distinction between the House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and concluded that there was also a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 12. In his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion Judge Mijovic expressed disappointment with the ECtHR’s brief reasoning in assessing alleged MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 13