CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 8.4 The Committee must therefore determine whether this restriction is authorized by article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 18 (3) permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only if limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 19 The Committee also recalls that paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.20 8.5 In the present case, the Committee notes that it is undisputed that the prohibition against wearing the niqab falls clearly within the scope defined under article 1 of Act No. 2010-1192. It is therefore incumbent upon the Committee to assess whether the restriction, which is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate objective, is necessary for achieving that objective, and is proportionate and non-discriminatory. 8.6 The Committee notes that the State party has indicated two objectives that the Act is intended to pursue, namely the protection of public order and safety, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 8.7 With respect to protection of public order and safety, the State party contends that it must be possible to identify all individuals when necessary to avert threats to the security of persons or property and to combat identity fraud. The Committee recognizes the need for States, in certain contexts, to be able to require that individuals show their faces, which might entail one-off obligations for individuals to reveal their faces in specific circumstances of a risk to public safety or order, or for identification purposes. The Committee observes, however, that the Act is not limited to such contexts, but comprehensively prohibits the wearing of certain face coverings in public at all times, and that the State party has failed to demonstrate how wearing the full-face veil in itself represents a threat to public safety or order that would justify such an absolute ban. Nor has the State party provided any public safety justification or explanation for why covering the face for certain religious purposes — i.e., the niqab — is prohibited, while covering the face for numerous other purposes, including sporting, artistic, and other traditional and religious purposes, is allowed. The Committee further observes that the State party has not described any context, or provided any example, in which there was a specific and significant threat to public order and safety that would justify such a blanket ban on the full-face veil. No such threats are described in the statement of purpose of Act No. 20101192 or in the National Assembly resolution of 11 May 2010, which preceded the adoption of the Act. 8.8 Even if the State party could demonstrate the existence of a specific and significant threat to public safety and order in principle, it has failed to demonstrate that the prohibition contained in Act No. 2010-1192 is proportionate to that objective, in view of its considerable impact on the author as a woman wearing the full-face veil. Nor has it attempted to demonstrate that the ban was the least restrictive measure necessary to ensure the protection of the freedom of religion or belief. 21 8.9 With regard to the second objective presented by the State party, understood as the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others under article 18 (3), the Committee notes the State party’s argument based on the concept of “living together” or respect for the minimum requirements of life in society, public spaces being the main place in which social life happens and people come into contact with others. According to the State party, showing one’s face signals a person’s readiness to be identified as an individual by the other party and not to “unfairly” conceal one’s frame of mind, this being “the minimum degree of trust that is essential for living together in an egalitarian and open 19 20 21 Ibid., para. 8. Ibid. E/CN.4/2006/5, para. 58. 11