CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 3.3 According to the author, there can be no disputing that the State is interfering in the religious freedom of the minority of Muslim women who wear the full-face veil (according to a parliamentary commission that studied the matter, fewer than 2,000 women are reportedly concerned). The author recalls, in this regard, the reservation entered by the French Constitutional Council regarding places of worship in its decision of 7 October 2010: 4 “The prohibition against concealing the face in public areas cannot, without excessively undermining article 10 of the Declaration of 1789, restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship open to the public.” According to the author, it must be admitted as a counterpoint that the exercise of religious freedom in the rest of public areas has indeed been restricted by the legislature. 3.4 The author refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee, in particular the R. Singh v. France ruling,5 in which the Committee found a violation of article 18 in a case of one-time interference, when a person was photographed bareheaded for the renewal of a residence permit. According to the author, the prohibition against wearing a full-face veil in public areas is all the more so a type of interference in her freedom of religion, as she is at all times being forced to appear without her full-face veil. 3.5 The author adds that the limitations to article 18 have not been justified on permissible grounds, such as those mentioned in article 18 (3) of the Covenant. While limitations are provided by the law, they are neither necessary nor proportionate to the objective. First of all, the objective has not been clearly defined by the legislature. Act No. 2010-1192 contains no statement of purpose and provides no information on its legal basis; it does not even refer to a parliamentary resolution of 11 May 2010 in which the National Assembly expressed the view that wearing a full-face veil went against the principles of the French Republic. 6 A quick look at the origins of the Act shows that it was justified exclusively by a political desire to ban, as a matter of principle, the wearing of the full-face veil;7 the law thus had no legitimate objective in the sense intended under article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The lack of a legitimate objective undermines the argument that the law was even necessary. 3.6 Even if such an objective were established, such a limitation could not possibly be considered as necessary and proportionate. The State has put forward the argument 8 that Act No. 2010-1192 pursued two main objectives: equality between men and women and the protection of public order. Such objectives, however, cannot justify an infringement of the right to manifest one’s religion. 3.7 First, the objective of equality between men and women cannot per se be associated with any of the purposes set out in article 18 (3). The Committee has stated, in its general comment No. 22 (para. 8), that restrictions were not allowed on grounds not specified in paragraph 3. The author adds that forcing women who wish to wear full-face veils in public to remove them constitutes the imposition of a dress code on women, and that presumptions relating to their attitudes towards gender inequality are based solely on prejudices held by some people about the way of life of certain groups. No woman wearing a full-face veil has ever advocated inequality between men and women. 3.8 As for the protection of public order, which is the only basis that could have been retained if the legislature had chosen, in accordance with the opinion of some members of 4 5 6 7 8 4 The parliament brought the case before the Constitutional Council on 14 September 2010, in accordance with the conditions set by article 61 (2) of the Act prohibiting the concealment of the face in public areas. In its decision of 7 October 2010, the Council declared the Act to be in conformity with the Constitution, while making a reservation in respect of places of worship open to the public. R. Singh v. France (CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009), para. 8.4. The author also refers to the cases of B. Singh v. France (CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008), para. 8.7; and S.M. Singh v. France (CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010), para. 9.5. National Assembly resolution of 11 May 2010 on the commitment to uphold republican values in the face of the development of radical practices that undermine them. The author notes that, on 22 June 2009, before a joint session of the French parliament held at Versailles, Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of the Republic, stated that “the burqa is not welcome in the French Republic”. The author refers to the fifth periodic report of France to the Committee (CCPR/C/FRA/5), paras. 429 ff.