A/69/266 • Prevention of delivery of essential services or assistance, targeting specific groups. 50. The Committee noted that the significance of the indicators for predicting genocide or violence against racial, ethnic or religious groups should be supplemented by additional general indicators on: (a) prior history of genocide or violence against a group; (b) policy or practice of impunity; (c) existence of proactive communities abroad fostering extremism and/or providing arms; and (d) presence of external mitigating factors, such as the United Nations or other recognized invited third parties. 51. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has produced an analysis framework 25 which comprises eight categories of factors for determining the risk of genocide: inter-group relations, including a record of discrimination and/or other human rights violations committed against a group; circumstances that affect the capacity to prevent genocide; presence of illegal arms and armed elements; motivation of leading actors in the State/region, and acts which serve to encourage divisions among national, racial, ethnic and religious groups; circumstances that facilitate the perpetration of genocide (dynamic factors); genocidal acts; evidence of intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; and triggering factors. 52. According to the framework, triggering factors include: upcoming elections; a change of Government outside of an electoral or constitutionally sanctioned process; instances in which the military is deployed internally to act against civilians; commencement of armed hostilities; natural disasters; and increases in opposition capacity, which may be perceived as a threat and prompt pre -emptive action. The Special Rapporteur considers that these valuable indicators can also be applied effectively in situations in which violence may not constitute genocide. Indicators and early warning mechanisms must be employed in practice and lead to alarms being triggered and concrete action taken. 53. Failure to act on early warnings is not confined to the national level. In April 1993, the then Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions visited Rwanda. His report, made public in August 1993 but not taken up by the Commission on Human Rights until the following March, warned that the targeting of ethnic Tutsis solely because they belonged to a specific ethnic group might constitute genocide. The international community failed to act on those war nings with tragic consequences. 54. The Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons visited the Central African Republic in 2007 and noted that the security forces lacked capacity to protect the population. A security vacuum was also found by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions who visited in 2008 and made a follow-up visit in 2010. He noted that villagers were increasingly organizing themselves into ad hoc self -defence groups and that ethnically motivated violence was on the rise. He stated that impunity for killings was pervasive. 55. In January 2009, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons warned that military operations in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo could result in violent __________________ 25 14-58850 www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framework.pdf. 15/24