A/67/303 legitimize pressure on converts or members of minorities, for example to make them reconvert to their previous religion or to follow mainstream religions or beliefs. 3. Freedom of “choice” — appropriateness of the term 59. The most fundamental objection against the right to freedom of religion or belief in the field of conversion is directed at the concept of “choice”, which lies at the very heart of this human right. It has been argued that the language of “choice” does not appropriately reflect the existential dimension of a deep religious or philosophical conviction and the sense of belonging and loyalty that goes with any profound conviction. The Special Rapporteur shares the view that religion or belief is not just an item within a catalogue of commodities that individuals may take or leave according to their personal tastes or preferences. However, a similar statement could be made about marriage and partnership and other important human life issues. Obviously, the “choice” of a spouse should not resemble the selection of an item from a catalogue. So again, the language of “choice”, as it comes up in human rights discourses on marriage and family life, inevitably fails to reach the existential significance of such an intimate relationship and sense of profound loyalty to which it is attached. Yet, having a right to free “choice” concerning partnership and marriage, as enshrined in international human rights documents, remains important, especially in the face of such phenomena as enforced marriage or child marriage, which, to this day, continue to exist. 60. The concept of “choice” makes sense especially in the sphere of law, including human rights law. Obviously, the language of law cannot reflect the full range of human experiences. In this regard, law has insurmountable limitations that one should always bear in mind. It remains true that a person’s existential experience, be it in the field of religion or belief or in relation to marriage and other important human life issues, may go far beyond the understanding of just making a “choice”. The legal language of human rights is not supposed to replace such experience, and it is by no means intended to lead to a “commodified” understanding of religion or belief or other significant issues relating to human life and human communities. The opposite is true. By establishing legal safeguards against different forms of coercion, human rights norms can arguably even contribute to the achievement of higher degrees of sincerity, earnestness, authenticity, profoundness, loyalty and commitment in questions of religion or belief. 61. It would thus be utterly wrong to delegitimize the concept of “choice” in the area of religion or belief, a concept particularly important when it comes to safeguarding the human rights of converts or those trying to convert others by means of non-coercive persuasion. Protecting every human being’s freedom of “choice” is a perfectly appropriate way to institutionalize, in the specific sphere of human rights law, the axiomatic respect that is due to all human beings by virtue of their inherent human dignity. Respect for human dignity, however, necessarily implies respecting the various deep convictions and commitments of all human beings by legally guaranteeing their freedom to have and adopt a religion or belief of their own “choice”. 12-46130 19