CERD/C/106/D/61/2017 these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws grant to other members of the population”. Article 5 also establishes that “the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognized and protected” and that “the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected”. Lastly, article 8 establishes that “in applying national laws to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws” and that indigenous peoples “shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights”. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples establishes that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination includes the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their social and cultural development and that, in exercising their right to self-determination, they have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions (arts. 3–5). The Declaration also establishes that indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their traditions, cultural customs and ceremonies (art. 11), to maintain their political and social institutions (art. 20) and to determine their own identity in accordance with their customs (art. 33). The petitioner recalls that the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that indigenous peoples “have the right to preserve, maintain and promote their own family systems” (art. XVII). 3.6 In light of the foregoing, the petitioner alleges that the State party has violated articles 1 (4), 2 (1) (a) and (2), and 5 (d) (iv) of the Convention, read in conjunction with the abovementioned international instruments, in that the civil registry cannot have exclusive competence to solemnize, authorize and register marriages since the recognition of marriages officiated by traditional authorities is based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples and the constitutional recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational State. 3.7 The petitioner underscores that indigenous peoples organized their lives and societies, including through ancestral marriages officiated by their institutions in accordance with their own cultures, for millennia before the construction of the State of Ecuador. The petitioner claims that the failure to recognize the jurisdiction of traditional indigenous institutions constitutes a discriminatory act by virtue of excluding indigenous peoples and their family systems from the scope of civil rights (e.g. access to family reunification visas) and thus forcing assimilation into the State institution of civil marriage. 3.8 The fact that a number of indigenous marriages have been officiated in Azuay, a point raised by the State party to prove that there is no discrimination, is precisely why the existence of such marriages should be legally recognized and “indigenous ways of life should stop being treated as folklore”. The petitioner clarifies that he is not denouncing an inability of indigenous authorities to officiate ancestral marriage ceremonies but, rather, the lack of recognition by the State party of the validity of such marriages. Indeed, indigenous institutions have always officiated marriages, but those marriages must be recognized by the State in order for couples to enjoy equal civil rights (in this case, the right to be issued a family reunification visa). 3.9 In response to the State party’s point that his first marriage in 1998 was officiated in accordance with domestic legislation, the petitioner argues that not having practised his customs in the past – owing to the difficulties many indigenous peoples have, as a result of colonization, in living and feeling on their own terms and following their own philosophy and social organization – should not be held against him in the present case. The petitioner notes that it is only recently that indigenous identity has begun to reassert itself following recognition in the 2008 Constitution. 3.10 As for the State party’s argument that his name change is evidence of nondiscrimination, the petitioner argues that a lack of discrimination in relation to a name change cannot be used to justify the discrimination inherent in not recognizing the officiation of an ancestral marriage. In addition, the petitioner notes that part of the colonization process was to impose Christian names on indigenous peoples, hence the current trend among indigenous persons of changing names in an effort to dissociate themselves from the colonial past. GE.22-11683 5