A/HRC/43/48/Add.2 right. This is likely the result of the strong links between ethnicity and religion, and a reliance on a “toleration” model of freedom of religion or belief, whereby individuals are seen as part of a community on whom both the State and the individual rely to negotiate rights and duties. A toleration model, however, might not embrace the inclusivity, equality and non-discrimination of all citizens, giving priority or prominence to the given majority or dominant group in a specific area, thereby marginalizing the rights of minorities or those perceived as not fitting into the recognized identities from the traditional mosaic of a society. 58. One of the challenges the country faces is the lack of equality among religious communities, especially when article 9 of the Constitution explicitly guarantees Buddhism the foremost place and mandates the State with the duty to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana. The provision is almost equivalent to Buddhism being made the official religion of the State. The Beirut Declaration on Faith for Rights and its 18 commitments 38 explicitly refer to preventing the use of the notion of “State religion” to discriminate against individuals or groups or to reduce the space for religious or belief pluralism in practice (A/HRC/40/58, annex II, commitment IV). 39 The Special Rapporteur reiterates that the extent to which the State supports a religion and the degree to which it enforces that religion could have far-reaching implications for how the State protects freedom of religion or belief for everyone (see A/HRC/37/49). 59. Even though article 9 assures persons of all religions the rights as provided in articles 10 and 14 (1) (e), most people not only see that Buddhism is granted “supremacy” over other religions or beliefs but have actually experienced discrimination based on their religion or belief. There is clear resentment against perceived majoritarian privilege. In practice, the majority Sinhalese Buddhist community asserts its protected status and perceived privilege accorded by the Constitution as it also seems to interpret or at least understand that it has “supreme” status. Hence, whenever the majority community itself feels insecure due to the changing religious landscape in the country or the economic and numerical growth of another community, it asserts itself more stridently as the majority community representing the nation. 60. The Special Rapporteur has also observed the tendency of some Buddhist religious leaders to instigate hatred and division among the population in Sri Lanka by invoking nationalist sentiments among people by politicizing ethnic and religious identity. Similarly, political parties have used ethno-nationalistic rhetoric in Sri Lanka, using the popularity of the “Sinha Le” campaign (see para. 66 of the present report) as a powerful tool to mobilize the public.40 For as long as the tension of identity among religious and ethnic groups exists, this will continue to undermine all of the peacebuilding, coexistence and religious tolerance and harmony projects, as each group of people will remain in their own boxes, rejecting and alienating the “others”. B. Religious extremism 61. Following the Easter bombings, media in Sri Lanka projected the country as a victim of the global trend of Islamic extremism, which made the Muslim community the scapegoat for other underlying problems in the country, such as simmering ethno-religious tensions and religious extremism. Many interlocutors with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke, however, indicated that they had already been highly concerned by the influence of extremist views of different religious figures, including Buddhist monks, from earlier on. However, certain politicians allegedly instrumentalize religions, possibly for political gain, and neglect the inherent risks of the incitement to hatred or violence by extremists. 62. There is no evidence to suggest that the Muslim population at large in Sri Lanka is linked with Islamic extremists or terrorists. Moreover, when Zaharan, a radical Salafi preacher, led his faction to attack the followers of a moderate Sufi Muslim cleric in 2017, he was repeatedly rejected by Muslim community leaders and some politicians. They also 38 39 40 12 See www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FaithForRights.aspx. See also www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/faith4rights-toolkit.pdf. See www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Dynamics-of-Sinhala-Buddhist-EthnoNationalism-in-Post-War-Sri-Lanka.pdf.