CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 open to the public.”3 Conversely, according to the author, it must be admitted that the exercise of her religious freedom in all other public spaces has been restricted by the legislature. 3.4 The author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence, in particular its Views in Ranjit Singh v. France, in which it found a violation of article 18 in a case of interference in the exercise of religious freedom, when a person was photographed bareheaded for the renewal of a residence permit.4 According to the author, the ban on wearing a full-face veil in public spaces is a similar but even worse form of interference with the freedom of religion, as she is being forced to appear without her full-face veil at all times. 3.5 The author adds that the limitations applied to article 18 have not been justified on permissible grounds, such as those set out in article 18 (3) of the Covenant. While the limitations are prescribed by law, they are neither necessary nor proportionate to the purpose of the Act. First of all, that purpose has not been clearly defined by the legislature. The Act includes no statement of purpose and provides no information on its legal basis; it does not even refer to the parliamentary resolution of 11 May 2010 in which the National Assembly expressed the view that wearing a full-face veil went against the principles of the French Republic.5 A quick look at the origins of the Act shows that it was justified exclusively by a political desire to ban, as a matter of principle, the wearing of the full-face veil; the Act thus has no legitimate purpose within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant.6 The lack of a legitimate purpose undermines the argument that the law was even necessary. 3.6 The author adds that, even if such a purpose were established, such a limitation could not possibly be considered as necessary and proportionate. The State has put forward the argument that the Act pursued two main objectives, namely: equality between men and women and the protection of public order. 7 Such objectives, however, cannot justify an infringement of the right to manifest one’s religion. 3.7 First, the objective of equality between men and women cannot be associated per se with any of the purposes set out in article 18 (3). The Committee has stated in its general comment No. 22 (1993) (para. 8) that restrictions were not allowed on grounds not specified in paragraph 3. The author adds that forcing women who wish to wear full-face veils to remove them in public spaces constitutes the imposition of a dress code on women and that presumptions relating to their attitudes towards gender inequality are based solely on prejudices held by some people about the way of life of certain groups. No woman wearing a full-face veil has ever advocated inequality between men and women. 3.8 As for the protection of public order, which is the only legal basis that could have been retained if the legislature had chosen, as proposed by some members of parliament, to limit the ban on wearing a full-face veil to certain places or occasions, or to establish an obligation to temporarily uncover the face for the purposes of identification. That, however, was not what the Government of France opted to do. 3.9 The author notes that it has never been claimed that women wearing the burka or the niqab – who, incidentally, are a tiny minority – threaten public safety or create public unrest. While it can legitimately be argued that, in certain specific circumstances, there is a need to be able to identify persons in public places with their faces uncovered, it is unthinkable for such an obligation to “unveil” to be permanent and absolute. Only specific, limited 3 4 5 6 7 4 Parliament referred the case to the Constitutional Council on 14 September 2010. By decision of 7 October 2010, the Constitutional Council declared the Act to be in conformity with the Constitution, while expressing a reservation with regard to places of worship open to the public. Ranjit Singh v. France (CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009), para. 8.4. The author also refers to the cases of Bikramjit Singh v. France (CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008), para. 8.7; and Shingara Mann Singh v. France (CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010), para. 9.5. National Assembly resolution of 11 May 2010 on the commitment to uphold republican values in the face of the development of radical practices that undermine them. The author notes that, on 22 June 2009, before a joint session of the parliament held at Versailles, Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of the Republic, stated that “the burka is not welcome in the French Republic”. The author refers to the fifth periodic report of France to the Committee (CCPR/C/FRA/5), paras. 429 ff.