criterion at all. Furthermore, while GCC 130(1) applies only to statements “capable of disturbing the public peace,” this limitation does not appear in GCC 130(2), which criminalizes, inter alia, the “dissemination” in writing or through the media of materials “which assault the human dignity of other by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming [a national, racial or religious group].” Nor is the limitation found in GCC 185, which criminalizes insult. Finally, the Convention need not be read to imply that considerations of public order are irrelevant to the application of the dissemination clause. To the contrary, in balancing the obligation to combat hate speech with the safeguarding of freedom of expression, as they must under the “due regard” clause, States parties, in my view, may permissibly determine that prosecution is warranted only if the speech threatens to disturb the public peace. 16.For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to agree that the State party violated the Convention. [Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as part of the Committee’s annual report to the General Assembly.]