CCPR/C/132/D/2552/2015 qualify as an exception to the prerequisite of prior exhaustion insofar as the domestic remedies that they have sought have been unreasonably prolonged. 3.2 The authors note that initiating criminal proceedings in defence of the environment and indigenous peoples is the remit of the Public Prosecution Service.19 3.3 The authors claim that the fumigation violates the rights of the community members under articles 17 and 27 of the Covenant, on the grounds that the farms have not complied with environmental law, the State party has not discharged its duty to provide protection and the community was not consulted about the activities adversely affecting its territory. 3.4 First, the authors claim a violation of article 17 of the Covenant, recalling that the State has an obligation to establish effective safeguards against interference and attacks, whether by State authorities or by natural or legal persons, and to adopt measures to give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right.20 3.5 In the case of indigenous peoples, the authors claim that the notions of “home” and “privacy” should be understood in the context of the special relationship, in particular the collective aspects thereof, that indigenous people have with their territories, in keeping with articles 25 and 26 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, they recall that, according to the Committee’s jurisprudence, these notions may fall under the sphere of protection afforded by article 17.21 The authors claim that, in the present case, these notions should encompass not only the huts or homes, but also the entire territory established for the community, as it is in this territory that the Guarani indigenous identity is expressed. 3.6 The authors note that the sphere of protection afforded by article 17, interpreted in the light of general comments No. 16 (1988) and No. 31 (2004), includes protection of the home and privacy from environmental pollution caused by the actions of third parties when those actions constitute unlawful or arbitrary interference with their privacy. Therefore, the State bears culpa in vigilando when it fails to enforce the laws governing agricultural activities conducted by third parties that cause pollution which has a detrimental effect on people’s home or privacy, in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 22 3.7 In the present case, the authorities had sufficient evidence to identify a causal link between, on the one hand, extensive spraying of toxic agrochemicals by the farms, the improper disposal of agrochemicals subject to environmental regulation and of banned agrochemicals, non-compliance with environmental laws regarding protective hedges and the presence of glyphosate in the rivers where the community members fish and draw water and, on the other, the contamination of waterways, the destruction of subsistence crops, the death of livestock, the mass extinction of fish and bees, and health problems. 3.8 Secondly, the authors claim a violation of article 27 of the Covenant as a result of the loss of the necessary conditions to preserve the community’s culture. 3.9 They recall that the Committee has recognized in its jurisprudence that the rights protected under article 27 include the right to engage in economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community.23 Specifically, in the case of indigenous peoples, the right to enjoy a particular culture may relate to a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of its resources, including such traditional activities as fishing or hunting. Safeguarding this right may require measures to ensure the participation of members of indigenous communities in decisions that affect them, thereby guaranteeing the survival and 19 20 21 22 23 6 Constitution, art. 268 (2). General comment No. 16 (1988), para. 1. Hopu and Bessert v. France (CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1), para. 10.3. López Ostra v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, application No. 16798/90, paras. 51, 55 and 58; Fadeyeva v. Russia, judgment of 9 June 2005, application No. 55723/00, paras. 68–70; and Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, judgment of 10 February 2011, application No. 30499/03, para. 105. In their response, the authors also refer to Cordella and Others v. Italy, judgment of 24 January 2019, applications No. 544141/13 and No. 54624/15, paras. 158 and 173–174, and to Human Rights Committee, Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay (CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016), para. 7.8. Poma Poma v. Peru (CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006), para. 7.3. GE.22-15010