A/HRC/29/36 remain in the European Union to travel to countries other than their first country of entry. In addition, under the Dublin system, migrants are often retained in front-line countries where there are very limited economic opportunities. For example, Italy has faced a huge influx of asylum seekers as well as a sustained economic downturn. This has resulted in migrants becoming stuck where there are no jobs available for them, with disastrous results for migrants and the host society. 51. The system also creates the potential for tension at borders, as many migrants do not want their fingerprints to be taken. Troubling reports have emerged recently about border management officials using force to collect fingerprints. The system also increases the market for smugglers and encourages the use of precarious routes across Europe, as migrants seeking protection are forced to do so in an irregular way, to avoid detection and forced fingerprinting. It is disconcerting to see that European Union rules and practices have caused the reappearance of smuggling routes within the Union, when such routes had practically disappeared with the establishment of freedom of movement. 52. The European Commission took note of the issue of forced fingerprinting in 2014. It requested information from European Union member States on the legal frameworks in place and common practices. Some States, such as Greece, Malta and Italy, have legally allowed the use of force if migrants resist fingerprinting, while other States, such as Austria and Ireland, have prohibited such a practice. Responses from all Governments tend to suggest that migrants and asylum seekers are rarely unwilling to give their fingerprints, while others have said that it is very difficult to force a person who fundamentally will not cooperate. Even countries, such as Malta, that reported migrants being uncooperative at the point of disembarkation claimed the individuals could typically be recalled later for fingerprinting. While these reports by member States are encouraging, troubling anecdotal evidence by migrants and front-line workers suggests that force has been used in countries of first entry to the European Union. 53. The European Court of Human Rights has recently ruled on two significant cases in relation to the Dublin logic. As discussed above, in 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, that both countries had violated articles 3 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in November 2014, the Court ruled on the refusal of Switzerland to examine the asylum application of members of an Afghan family and the decision to send them back to Italy without assurances that their rights would be protected. The Court held that there had been a violation of article 3 of the Convention and discussed “systemic deficiencies” in the Italian system. In 2011, in M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, the Court held that Belgium had violated article 3 of the Convention by deporting an Afghan migrant to Greece despite systemic failures in asylum and social protection provisions. 54. Alongside this jurisprudence, there are other signs that the Dublin logic is failing and that the restrictions to freedom of movement are not sustainable. For example, FRONTEX has reported that European Union border States are making significant reforms to detention policies, possibly enabling greater freedom of movement and a decrease in successful returns. Migrant workers 55. The precarious routes to Europe discussed above are mixed migration channels, with economic migrants also risking their lives to seek opportunities because regular channels for migrant workers to the European Union do not exist. Some progress in opening up economic migration channels has been made through the development of the Blue Card system and the seasonal workers directive. However, use of the Blue Card among European Union member States is low and sustained opportunities for low-skilled migrants are scant. In sectors where regulation is inadequate, such as domestic work, care, construction, 11