CCPR/C/139/D/2925/2017 Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The Committee notes Mr. Yurlov’s claim under article 18 (1) and (3) of the Covenant that his right to manifest his religious beliefs in community with others was violated by the dissolution of the Elista local religious organization, the confiscation of its property and by it being declared an extremist organization. In its general comment No. 22 (1993), the Committee recalled that article 18 does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice (para. 3). By contrast, the right to freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject to certain limitations, but only those prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others (para. 8). The Committee notes the argument of the State party that the Elista organization was dissolved in accordance with the Federal Act on Combating Extremist Activity, on the grounds of its storage and mass distribution of banned extremist literature. The Committee also notes the State party’s reference to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Kalmykia that the literature in question contained elements of propaganda regarding the pre-eminence of one religion over another, which offended religious sensibilities and incited interreligious conflicts, presenting a threat to the State party as a religiously diverse, secular State. The Committee must ascertain whether the arguments of the State party are compatible with the limitations permissible under article 18 (3) of the Covenant. 9.3 Regarding the first requirement under article 18 (3) of the Covenant that the limitation must be prescribed by law, the Committee notes that the Federal Act on Combating Extremist Activity contains a vague and open-ended definition of “extremist activity” that does not require any element of violence or hatred to be present. It also notes that no clear and precise criteria on how materials may be classified as extremist are provided in the law. 15 Furthermore, the Committee notes the statement of the Supreme Court of Kalmykia in its judgment of 25 February 2016 that the Elista local religious organization threatened the rights and freedoms of others, as well as the State, by distributing printed materials that abased human dignity based on the attitude towards religion, elements of propaganda regarding the pre-eminence of one religion over another, incited religious discord and presented a threat to the Russian Federation as a religiously diverse, secular State. This reasoning led the court to conclude that the Elista organization is engaged in extremist activity and to proceed to its dissolution. 9.4 The Committee notes that the Supreme Court did not clarify which statements in the publications led it to conclude that they were extremist and offensive and posed a threat to the rights of others and the State. The Committee also notes, referring to the Supreme Court’s decision, that a religiously diverse and secular State should enable every religious organization to coexist peacefully and without discrimination, while freely adhering to its beliefs and doctrines, even if they are offensive to others. The Committee refers to its general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, in which it clarified that prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20 (2) of the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with the strict requirements of article 19 (3), as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26. Thus, for instance, it would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, or their adherents, over another, or religious believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith (para. 48). In the present case, the State party did not provide information which would lead the Committee to believe that Mr. Yurlov’s organization acted contrary to article 20 (2) of the Covenant. Without providing any concrete facts about how the publications distributed by Mr. Yurlov’s organization threatened the rights of others and the secularity of the State, the Supreme Court imposed the strictest available sanction, dissolving the organization. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee cannot conclude that the law 15 10 CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, para. 20. GE.24-00304