A/72/365 IV. International legal framework and tools to combat religious intolerance A. International legal framework 46. Freedom of religion or belief is interwoven with the core principles of equality, non-discrimination and non-coercion 13 and overlaps with other rights, including the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, and education. It must, therefore, be understood in the context of articles 18 to 20 and be read together with core principles enunciated by articles 2 and 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. An abuse of one right can be an obstacle to the enjoyment of all the others. It is also clear that the right to freedom of religion or belief does not give the individual — as a rights holder — the power to marginalize, suppress or carry out violent acts against other individuals. As stated in article 5 (1) of the Covenant, no State, group or person has the right “to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized” in the Covenant. This is especially applicable with regard to individuals in vulnerable situations, such as women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex persons, under the guise of manifesting their religion or protecting the “moral high ground”. Furthermore, criticism of religion, religious leaders or doctrine is not a violation of the right to freedom of religion or belief. 47. Limitations to the right to manifest freedom of religion or belief can be applied only in exceptionally rare cases, and States can never, under any circumstances, restrict the right to have or adopt a religion or belief. The rare exceptions, as defined in article 18 (3) of the Covenant, are “subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”. None of those limitations can be applied for discriminatory purposes or in a discriminatory manner. 48. Similarly, the right to freedom of expression can be limited only to protect other rights, including the right to freedom of religion or belief, in very narrow circumstances. The Human Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of the Covenant, has clarified in its general comment 34 (2011) (CCPR/C/GC/34) that in meeting their specific obligation to prohibit speech that advocates religious hatred constituting incitement (as outlined in article 20 (2)), St ates must also comply with the general criteria outlined in article 19 (3) for all speech restrictions. That article requires in part that any such limitations be prescribed by law, undertaken for a legitimate aim and necessary to achieve that aim. 49. Article 20 (2) is “premised on a triangular relationship between inciter, audience and target group”. The article is, therefore, less concerned about the relationship between offender and offended, or the direct harm extreme speech (in and of itself) may cause to the targeted individual or group. Rather, “its prime concern lies in the harm a third party, the extreme speech’s audience, may do to that group”. Accordingly, the applicability of article 20 (2) requires that: (a) an inciter publicly addresses an audience; (b) the content of the inciter’s speech targets a group on the basis of its religious (or racial or national) characteristics; and (c) the content of the speech will in all likelihood incite the audience to commit acts of violence (or discrimination or hostility) against the target group. 14 It should be noted, however, __________________ 13 14 14/24 See Nazila Ghanea, “Religion, equality and non-discrimination”, in John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green, eds., Religion and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). Jeroen Temperman, Religious Hatred and International Law: The Prohibition of Incitement to Violence or Discrimination (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), chap. 7.4. 17-14822