A/72/365 interpretations of religious sources or by an ideological commitment to impose a particular world view. Such violations are most often aggravated in situations, including conflict situations, where the level of intolerance is at its hig hest, rule of law is at its weakest and fear is the common currency. 37. Non-State actors such as business entities are not immune to this trend. They can, and have, claimed a supposed “right” to discriminate by refusing to provide services to persons, including women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and members of minority religious communities, on the basis of religious objections. This discrimination can take many forms, including refusal to hire or promote individuals who do not adhere to a particular faith, requiring selective background checks for those suspected of belonging to a particular faith, refusal to provide insurance coverage for contraception for employees or refusal of services altogether. D. Securitization of religion or belief 38. The securitization of religion or belief is largely a State response to countering violence in the name of religion. Non-State actors who use violence in the name of religion have been responsible for some of the most egregious human rights violations, including killing, torture, enslavement and trafficking, rape and other sexual abuse amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide (see A/HRC/32/CRP.2). Undoubtedly, States must be empowered to carry out t heir obligations to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Yet an overly securitized approach to countering violent extremism in the name of religion has often proven to be counterproductive and has led to increased levels of religious intolerance. 39. In his report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur briefly addressed the issue of securitization of religion as a troubling phenomenon that has played an increasing role in the restriction of the right to religion or belief. He noted that the phenomenon, which is “largely a State response to countering violence in the name of religion, further compounds the corrosive conditions that already undermine the right to freedom of religion or belief” and will require close scrutiny (A/HRC/34/50, para. 37). 40. What is clear, therefore, is that the State response to violent extremism in the name of religion cannot rely solely on a securitization model that is dependent on brute force, or one that treats security and the respect for human rights as a zerosum game. As the Special Rapporteur noted, “while the quest for security and efforts to promote human rights are often seen as conflicting priorities, the failure to reconcile and resolve such tensions might actually make communities less secure” (ibid., para. 55). This phenomenon has been acknowledged in pillar IV of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and referred to repeatedly by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of h uman rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. 41. It is important to note that both members of religious minority groups and religious majority communities may become victims of heavy -handed securitization schemes that continue to be employed by States in several regions, including East Asia, Central Asia and parts of the former Soviet Union. Over the past few years there has been a sharp increase in the number of experts in the area of preventing or countering violent extremism, linked to a growing cottage industry surrounding the design and implementation of such programmes, with several countries in North America and Western Europe taking the lead. 42. While the Special Rapporteur is keen to engage with other United Nations rights mechanisms and governments to better understand the design and 12/24 17-14822