CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 greenhouse gases that gives rise over time to global warming and climate change,6 States should act with due diligence based on the best science when taking mitigation and adaptation action. This is an individual responsibility of the State, relative to the risk at stake and its capacity to address it. A higher standard of due diligence applies in respect of those States with significant total emissions or very high per capita emissions (whether these are past or current emissions), given the greater burden that their emissions place on the global climate system, as well as in respect of States with higher capacities for taking highly ambitious mitigation action.7 This higher standard applies to the State party in this case. 6. The Committee has significant practice on article 27 of the Covenant, with much of its case law concerning the rights of Indigenous Peoples.8 In this case, it has found a violation because of the State party’s failure to adopt timely adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture under article 27. In my view, the Committee should have linked the State obligation to “protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life and to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources” (para. 8.14 of the Views) more clearly to mitigation measures, based on national commitments and international cooperation, as it is mitigation actions which are aimed at addressing the root cause of the problem and not just remedying the effects. If no effective mitigation actions are taken in a timely manner, adaptation will eventually become impossible. Such land and sea resources will not be available for Indigenous Peoples or even for humanity more generally, without diligent national efforts, as well as joint and concerted mitigation actions of the organized international community. 7. Climate change concerns have been addressed over the years by the Committee and other United Nations human rights treaty bodies,9 the special procedures of the Human Rights Council10 and more generally by the United Nations.11 This case shows the possibilities and limitations of human rights-based litigation. That said, alongside other general or specific institutional arrangements addressing climate change issues, the Committee provides a suitable venue for addressing some concerns, especially under articles 6, 7, 17 and 27, both under the Optional Protocol and under article 41 of the Covenant. 6 7 8 9 10 11 24 international law”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2020), (see principles 2, 4, 10, 11 and 14). Jacqueline Peel, “Climate change”, in The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos, eds. (Cheltenham, Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 1031. Ibid., p. 1035. For example, William A. Schabas, Nowak’s CCPR Commentary, 3rd revised ed. (Kehl am Rhein, N.P. Engel, 2019), pp. 809–812. Teitiota v. New Zealand, E/C.12/2018/1 and HRI/2019/1. See also M.K.A.H. v. Switzerland (CRC/C/88/D/95/2019), Sacchi et al. v. Argentina (CRC/C/88/D/104/2019), Sacchi et al. v. Brazil (CRC/C/88/D/105/2019), Sacchi et al. v. France (CRC/C/88/D/106/2019), Sacchi et al. v. Germany (CRC/C/88/D/107/2019) and Sacchi et al. v. Turkey (CRC/C/88/D/108/2019). See A/70/287, A/74/161, A/HRC/40/55, A/HRC/41/39, A/HRC/43/53 and Human Rights Council resolution 48/14. See www.un.org/en/climatechange. See also A/HRC/50/57.