A/75/590 community links. 32 In an increasingly anti-immigrant global landscape, criticisms have surfaced that migration data has also been misinterpreted and misrepresented for political ends, for example to affect the distribution of aid. Inaccurate data can also be used to stoke fear and xenophobia, as seen in the characterization of the group of migrants attempting to claim asylum at the United States-Mexico border, 33 or the galvanization of anti-migrant sentiments in the Mediterranean area, including the recently proposed floating barrier walls. 34 Societal fear is then used to justify increasingly hardline responses that contravene international human rights law. 35 As one submission notes, in polarized, anti-immigrant and even xenophobic political contexts, “the data used to inform machine learning algorithms at borders or used in political campaigns or legislation can be flawed, and in an environment of structural bias against minorities such misrepresentation of data can fuel disinformation, hate speech and violence”. 36 16. Central to assessing the human rights landscape of digital borders is the role of private corporations whose pursuit of profit has played an impo rtant role in driving the expansion of digital technology in immigration and border enforcement, often in partnerships that allow governments to abdicate responsibility for violations that may result from the use of these technologies. The term “border ind ustrial complex” has been used to describe “the nexus between border policing, militarization and financial interest”, 37 as governments increasingly turn to the private sector to manage migration through new technologies predominately through a national security lens that neglects fundamental human rights. 38 Trends that fuel the border industrial complex include the externalization, militarization and automation of borders. 39 In the United States, the budget for border and immigration enforcement has increa sed by more than 6,000 per cent since 1980. 40 The European Union budget for the management of external borders, migration and asylum for 2021–2027 will increase by 2.6 times, amounting to more than €34.9 billion, compared to €13 billion for 2014 –2020. 41 Recent market research reports project the compound annual growth rate for this global border security market to be between 7.2 and 8.6 per cent (US$65 to 68 billion) by 2025. 42 17. Among the emerging digital technologies that drive the border industrial complex, drones that service border monitoring, and biometrics that help build “smart borders”, 43 play a key role. The big corporate players and beneficiaries in the border monitoring service sector are largely Global North military companies, s ome of which, like Lockheed Martin, are the largest arms sellers in the world. 44 Information technology companies such as IBM are also major players, including in data gathering and processing roles. 45 Many of these corporate actors exert great influence i n __________________ 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 20-14872 See https://news.stanford.edu/2018/01/18/algorithm-improves-integration-refugees/. Submission by the Center on Race, Inequality and the Law, at the New York University School of Law. See www.dezeen.com/2020/02/10/greece-floating-sea-border-wall-news/. See also Ana Beduschi, “International migration management in the age of artificial intelligence”, Migration Studies (2020); and the submission from Ana Beduschi. Submission by Minority Rights Group International. See www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/1/why-climate-action-needs-to-target-the-borderindustrial-complex/. Submission by Dhakshayini Sooriyakumaran and Brami Jegan. Ibid. Ibid. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4106 . See www.issuewire.com/border-security-system-industry-projected-to-garner-usd-6781-billionby-2025-flir-systems-lockhee-1631530966252699 and www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/border-security-market-1662. Submission by Dhakshayini Sooriyakumaran and Brami Jegan. Ibid. Ibid. 9/25