CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 the communication. The Committee therefore proceeds to examine the communication on its merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that by removing him to Kiribati, the State party subjected him to a risk to his life in violation of article 6 of the Covenant, and that the State party’s authorities did not properly assess the risk inherent in his removal. 9.3 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal, that it cannot derive merely from the general conditions in the receiving State, except in the most extreme cases,13 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.14 The obligation not to extradite, deport or otherwise transfer, pursuant to article 6 of the Covenant, may be broader than the scope of the principle of non-refoulement under international refugee law, since it may also require the protection of aliens not entitled to refugee status. States parties must, however, allow all asylum seekers claiming a real risk of a violation of their right to life in the State of origin access to refugee or other individualized or group status determination procedures that could offer them protection against refoulement. 15 Therefore, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.16 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or a denial of justice.17 9.4 The Committee recalls that the right to life cannot be properly understood if it is interpreted in a restrictive manner, and that the protection of that right requires States parties to adopt positive measures. The Committee also recalls its general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, in which it established that the right to life also includes the right of individuals to enjoy a life with dignity and to be free from acts or omissions that would cause their unnatural or premature death (para. 3).18 The Committee further recalls that the obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life. 19 States parties may be in violation of article 6 of the Covenant even if such threats and situations do not result in the loss of life.20 Furthermore, the Committee recalls that environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.21 9.5 Moreover, the Committee observes that both it and regional human rights tribunals have established that environmental degradation can compromise effective enjoyment of 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 30. For example, B.D.K. et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/125/D/3041/2017), para. 7.3; and K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 31. For example, X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. For example, M.M. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/125/D/2345/2014), para. 8.4; B.D.K. et al. v. Canada, para. 7.3. See also Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial. Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay (CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016), para. 7.3. Toussaint v. Canada (CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014), para. 11.3; and Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, para. 7.5. For example, Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, para. 7.3. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 62. 9