CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not currently being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 8.3 Noting that the State party has not contested the author’s argument that he has exhausted all available domestic remedies, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication. 8.4 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol because the author has not sufficiently substantiated his claim that when he was removed to Kiribati, he faced an imminent risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence stating that a person can only claim to be a victim in the sense of article 1 of the Optional Protocol if he or she is actually affected.9 It is a matter of degree how concretely that requirement should be taken. However, any person claiming to be a victim of a violation of a right protected under the Covenant must demonstrate either that a State party has, by act or omission, already impaired the exercise of his or her right or that such impairment is imminent, basing his or her arguments on, for example, legislation in force or on a judicial or administrative decision or practice.10 If the law or practice has not already been concretely applied to the detriment of that individual, it must in any event be applicable in such a way that the alleged victim’s risk of being affected is more than a theoretical possibility. 11 Individuals claiming to be victims of a violation by a State party of article 6 of the Covenant must demonstrate that the State party’s actions resulted in a violation of their right to life, specific to the individuals, or presented an existing or imminent threat to their enjoyment of that right.12 8.5 The Committee notes, however, that the author’s communication sought to prevent his imminent deportation from New Zealand to Kiribati. Accordingly, the question before the Committee is not whether he was, at the time of submission, a victim of a past violation of the Covenant, but rather whether he has substantiated the claim that he faced upon deportation a real risk of irreparable harm to his right to life. The Committee considers that, in the context of attaining victim status in cases of deportation or extradition, the requirement of imminence primarily attaches to the decision to remove the individual, whereas the imminence of any anticipated harm in the receiving State influences the assessment of the real risk faced by the individual. The Committee notes in that connection that the author’s claims relating to conditions on Tarawa at the time of his removal do not concern a hypothetical future harm, but a real predicament caused by a lack of potable water and employment possibilities, and a threat of serious violence caused by land disputes. 8.6 Based on the information the author presented to the domestic authorities and in his communication, the Committee considers that the author sufficiently demonstrated, for the purpose of admissibility, that due to the impact of climate change and associated sea level rise on the habitability of Kiribati and on the security situation on the islands, he faced a real risk of impairment to his right to life under article 6 of the Covenant as a result of the State party’s decision to remove him to Kiribati. Accordingly, the Committee considers that articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol do not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of 9 10 11 12 8 For example, Rabbae et al. v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011), para. 9.5. For example, Rabbae et al. v. Netherlands, para. 9.5; Picq v. France (CCPR/C/94/D/1632/2007), para. 6.3; Human Rights Committee, E.W. et al. v. Netherlands, communication No. 429/1990, para. 6.4; and Aalbersberg et al. v. Netherlands, para. 6.3. Human Rights Committee, Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al. v. Mauritius, communication No. 35/1978, para. 9.2. For example, Aalbersberg et al. v. Netherlands, para. 6.3; and Bordes and Temeharo v. France (CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995), para. 5.5.