CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 under article 19, are not infringed. The Committee recalls in this regard that freedom of expression embraces even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive.20 Moreover, the free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential to the promotion and protection of free expression. 21 The Committee also recalls its jurisprudence that prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20 (2).22 Similarly, such prohibitions may not be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith.23 The Committee further recalls that articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other.24 A prohibition that is justified on the basis of article 20 must also comply with the strict requirements of article 19 (3).25 Thus, in every case, measures of prohibition under article 20 (2) must also be “provided by law”; they may only be imposed for one of the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19 (3), and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. 26 The Committee notes that article 20 (2) does not expressly require the imposition of criminal penalties, but instead requires that such advocacy be “prohibited by law”. Such prohibitions may include civil and administrative as well as criminal penalties. 10.5 The Committee observes that the authors have not challenged the manner in which the State party has chosen to legislatively implement article 20 (2), but argue that owing to insufficient advocacy by the prosecution, errors in the reasoning of the court, and the lack of any appeal, the criminal prosecution was ineffective in this case. The Committee notes that the State party has chosen to implement article 20 (2) through section 137d of the Criminal Code, which is enforceable through criminal prosecution. According to the State party, private remedies are also available through a civil action appended to a criminal proceeding pursuant to section 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and through section 6:162 of the Civil Code. According to the State party, the concept of “incitement” in section 137d of the Criminal Code is intended to reach “inflammatory behaviour that incites the commission of criminal offences or acts of violence”. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that section 137d criminalizes incitement to hatred or discrimination only against persons, not religions, since criticism of even the most deeply-held convictions of the adherents of a religion is protected by freedom of expression. The State party notes that, in the difficult area of hate speech, each set of facts is particular and must be assessed by a court or impartial decision maker on a case-by-case basis, according to its own circumstances and taking into account the specific context. 10.6 The Committee observes that in the present case, the State party’s domestic law afforded interested persons the opportunity to secure an order from the Amsterdam Court of Appeal directing the public prosecutor to prosecute Mr. Wilders. The public prosecutor charged Mr. Wilders with “insult of a group for reasons of race or religion” under section 137c of the Criminal Code, and “incitement to hatred and discrimination on grounds of religion or race” under section 137d, for all of the statements set forth in the authors’ submission. Pursuant to section 51 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the authors joined a civil claim to the criminal proceeding, and were allowed to introduce arguments that Mr. Wilders’ conduct violated section 137d. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the public prosecutor impartially represented the prosecutor’s office and fully 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Ibid., para. 11. Ibid., para. 20. Ibid., para. 48. Ibid., para. 48. Ibid., para. 50. Ibid., para. 48. See also paras. 50 and 52. Ibid., para. 22. 17