E/CN.4/2006/5 page 16 by preserving religious harmony according to the circumstances of a given case. However, developing a set of general criteria to balance competing human rights seems to be desirable in order to give some guidance in terms of the applicable international human rights standards and their scope. In a manner similar to the guideline developed in 2004 by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE,15 the aim of these general criteria is to assist national and international bodies in their analyses and reviews of laws and draft legislation pertaining to the freedom of religion or belief. The Special Rapporteur invites Governments that intend to regulate the wearing of religious symbols to consider seeking advisory services from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 52. When developing such a set of general criteria, the competing human rights and public interests put forward in national and international forums need to be borne in mind. Freedom of religion or belief may be invoked both in terms of the positive freedom of persons who wish to wear or display a religious symbol and in terms of the negative freedom of persons who do not want to be confronted with or coerced into it. Another competing human right may be the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights, as well as the principle of the right to be protected from discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The right of everyone to education may be invoked by pupils who have been expelled for wearing religious symbols in accordance with their religion or belief. Furthermore, the rights of parents or legal guardians to organize life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education which they believe should inform the child’s upbringing (see article 5 (1) of the Declaration) may also be at stake. On the other hand, the State may try to invoke the “denominational neutrality of the school system” and the desire to “[preserve] religious harmony in schools” (see the Swiss Federal Court in the Dahlab case). According to the individual opinion by Human Rights Committee member Ruth Wedgwood in the Hudoyberganova case “a State may be allowed to restrict forms of dress that directly interfere with effective pedagogy”.16 Furthermore, the recent European Court Grand Chamber judgement in the Şahin case referred to the need to “preserve public order and to secure civil peace and true religious pluralism, which is vital to the survival of a democratic society”. 53. However, any limitation must be based on the grounds of public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, it must respond to a pressing public or social need, it must pursue a legitimate aim and it must be proportionate to that aim.17 Furthermore, the burden of justifying a limitation upon the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief lies with the State. Consequently, a prohibition of wearing religious symbols which is based on mere speculation or presumption rather than on demonstrable facts is regarded as a violation of the individual’s religious freedom.18 54. With regard to the scope of permissible limitation clauses, the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 22 emphasizes that article 18 (3) of the Covenant “is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and