A/79/182 created to make this choice possible, which at the very least requires States not to violate this freedom and for non-State actors not to interfere with it. 57 39. Freeing up conscience, as called for by freedom of religion or belief, also frees conscience from manipulation, polarization and instrumentalization. The very question of whether populations are co-opted in calls for legitimizing war or are liberated to become “militants for peace” 58 rests on this. 40. This freeing of conscience implies positive obligations on the part of the State but also responsibilities at the societal and community levels. Freedom of religion or belief has been described as having an internal dimension (forum internum) and an external dimension (forum externum). 59 The forum internum relates to the right to have, adopt and change thought, conscience, religion or belief, which can be theistic, non-theistic, atheistic or other; 60 the forum externum relates to the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, including in community with others and in public. Cutting across both of these is the freedom to interpret, understand and thereby manifest one’s religion or belief. Although thought, conscience and religion may be informed by others, and even strongly shaped by association with others, it ultimately attaches to the individual’s own conscience and understanding. This understanding is empowered through the fulfilment of other rights, including education, association, peaceful assembly, opinion and expression, privacy and digital safety. 41. The freedom to interpret also offers a powerful resilience in times of polarization that may lead to violence, conflict and war. It can allow individuals to stand against the tide of conflict, refuse to accept the distortion and utilization of their reli gion or belief for war – especially but not exclusively if the conflict has interreligious or intrareligious associations – and to resolutely stand for peace and human rights for all. Promoting constructive engagement on the understanding of religious texts and encouraging interpretations cognizant of a “globalized world composed of increasingly multicultural and multi-religious societies” 61 supports this objective. IV. How religion and peace affect States in relation to their freedom of religion or belief obligations 42. The observations discussed in section III above, about both the ambivalence and the role of religion in conflict, might be at home in international relations, peace studies and political science, but they are also critical to freedom of religion or belie f. This is especially the case because understandings about the relationship between conflict and religion are explicitly put forward or implicitly influence how States approach religious or belief matters and communities. 43. The extensive and essentializing narratives about religion and insecurity, conflict and war regrettably leave a deep imprint on how States relate to their obligations regarding freedom of religion or belief. 44. This is the case despite the fact that, pursuant to article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, freedom of religion or belief cannot be subject to derogation, even in situations of national emergency, and that freedom of religi on or belief and security are “complementary, interdependent and mutually reinforcing __________________ 57 58 59 60 61 10/22 General Assembly resolution 47/135, annex, art. 3 (2); and E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, para. 54. Appleby, “Religion and global affairs” (see footnote 25). CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, paras. 1 and 3–4; and Caroline Roberts, Freedom of Religion or Belief in the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2023). CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 2; and A/HRC/40/58, annex I, para. 10. A/HRC/40/58, annex II, commitment III. 24-13239