CEDAW/C/81/D/68/2014 the Committee also takes note of the author’s submission that the rule on ex haustion of domestic remedies does not apply if the application of such remedies is unlikely to bring effective relief, as recognized by the Committee in Kell v. Canada, and that, in particular, a Charter remedy would have been ineffective and unreasonably prolonged, given that Ms. McIvor, for example, was obliged to wait for 26 years to receive a partial remedy. According to the author, it is very expensive to sustain such legal action, given that he has a very low annual income and is a beneficiary of a Canadian disability pension plan, and considering that the Court Challenges Program does not have sufficient funding. The Committee observes that three constitutional claims on the same issue resulted in three sets of legislative reforms, in 1985, 2011 and 2019, that allegedly maintain the provisions that are discriminatory on the basis of gender raised by the author in the present communication. The Committee is therefore of the view that the constitutional claim referred to by the State party would have been unreasonably prolonged and unlikely to bring effective relief to the author and his children. The Committee therefore concludes that it is not precluded, by virtue of the requirements of article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol, from considering the present communication. 17.6 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible under article 4 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol under the provisions of the Convention, because the distinction alleged by the author is not on the basis of sex, but rather on the basis of lineage, which is not grounds of discrimination under the Convention. Nevertheless, the Committee notes that the State party has acknowledged on several occasions the gender-based inequities in the registration provisions of the Indian Act (see paras. 14.3 and 16.1 above) and that Bill S-3 itself was initially called “An act to amend the Indian Act to eliminate sex based inequities in Indian registration” (see para. 11.1 above). Moreover, the Committee considers that the communication relates to distinctions between individuals depending on their maternal or paternal lineage, thereby conferring on the Committee the competence to examine it. The Committee therefore considers that it is not precluded, by virtue of the requirements of article 4 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, from considering the present communication. 17.7 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible under article 4 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol, because the facts on which the alleged discrimination is based – the author’s grandmother’s loss of entitlement in 1927 – occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Canada. The Committee also takes note of the author’s argument, referring to reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples and the Committee itself, that the alleged violations are ongoing and also emanate from the amendments of 2011 and 2019. The Committee observes that, although the starting date of the alleged discrimination is 1927, before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, the loss of entitlement of the author’s grandmother has current consequences for her descendants. Moreover, the legislative amendments that allegedly perpetuate the effects of the discrimination came into force after 2003, that is, after the Optional Protocol had entered into force for the State party. Therefore, the alleged failure of the State party to protect the complainant and his children against the alleged violations occurred after the State party’s recognition of the Committee’s competence under the Optional Protocol. 17 In such circumstances, the Committee considers that it is not precluded ratione temporis under article 4 (2) (e) __________________ 17 14/19 The Committee recalls that it has previously observed that the remaining discriminatory provisions of the Indian Act continued to affect indigenous women and their descendants (CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/8-9, para. 13). See also Human Rights Committee, McIvor and Grismer v. Canada (CCPR/C/124/D/2020/2010), para. 6.3. 22-03658