A/HRC/18/35/Add.4 33. Since the visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, the Government has taken several steps to improve the Treaty settlement process. For example, the Government has hired an increased number of high-level negotiators, so that the negotiations can take place at the “rangatira to rangatira” (“chief to chief”) level, in accordance with Maori cultural practices. In addition, the Office of Treaty Settlements is, in most cases, drafting the deeds of settlements and enacting legislation at the same time, in order to reduce the time between the signing of the settlements and the settlement legislation being introduced into Parliament.17 The Government is also developing a programme to provide iwi leaders with assistance to boost their capacity in the Treaty settlement process.18 Furthermore, as noted above, the Government has committed to settle all outstanding agreements with iwi by 2014, six years earlier than the previous Government’s deadline, and has committed increased funding of NZ$22.4 million over the period from 2010 to 2014 to assist in meeting this goal.19 34. The Government has also taken some measures to open up more issues to the negotiation process, one example being the Crown’s policy with respect to conservation sites. Under the Crown’s 1994 policy, the transfer of ownership of Crown-owned conservation land was limited to “small and discrete sites”. However, recognizing that the former policy did not adequately recognize the dislocation of Maori from ancestral sites, the Government amended its policy to provide negotiators with more flexibility to bear in mind the connection of iwi to certain public conservation land, to allow for settlement packages that include participation of iwi in conservation management, transfer of ownership of lands and sites, and to allow statutory acknowledgement of iwi connections to particular sites. (b) Ongoing concerns 35. While it is evident that numerous iwi have benefitted from the Treaty settlement process in important respects, the Special Rapporteur heard numerous concerns about it. An overarching concern is that the negotiation procedure is flawed from the outset because the party responsible for the breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi—the Government—is wholly responsible for determining the framework policies and procedures for redress for those breaches, resulting in a situation that is inherently imbalanced and unfair to Maori. 36. Among the more specific concerns is that the Government determines the group with which it will negotiate, and that it has a policy to negotiate claims with “large natural groupings” rather than individual whanau and hapu. According to the Government, “this makes the process of settlement easier to manage and work through, and helps deal with overlapping interests” as well as helps reduce costs for both the Government and claimants.20 Further, the Government points out that some specific agreements can be made as to individual whanau or hapu within the framework of the larger agreement, although this is not very common. 37. However, Maori groups communicated that the Government’s approach often overlooks the specific claims of smaller groups. The Special Rapporteur received information about the particular situation of members of the Ruawaipu, Ngati Uepohatu and Te Aitanga-a-Hauiti iwi, who have grievances in the East Coast District, but who do not consider themselves to be represented by the group the Government is negotiating with to 17 18 19 20 New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, “Background report” (note 8 above), p. 11. Ibid. Human Rights Commission, Treaty of Waitangi: 2009 in Review, p. 11. New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, Healing the Past, Building a Future: A Guide to the Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Negotiations with the Crown, 2nd edition (Wellington, 2002), p. 44. 11