A/55/280/Add.2 members must be elected from among the indigenous population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (with each community being allocated a certain quota), and onethird from among the region’s non-indigenous population. The President of the Council must be a member of the indigenous population, and holds the rank of Minister of State. The Council must have powers of supervision and coordination in areas such as law and order, general administration, traditional law and social justice, as well as development activities. A land Commission must also facilitate regulation of land-related conflicts — especially those related to the restoration of property stolen from the indigenous population. The Accord also provides for the granting of an amnesty to members of the Shanti Bahini and the PCJSS; for the rehabilitation of indigenous refugees and displaced persons (especially through the Land Commission); for withdrawal from temporary military camps and village defence camps; and for the creation of a Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, assisted by a consultative committee (comprising the Minister of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the President/representative of the Regional Council and each district council, three members of parliament for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, three leaders of indigenous communities, and three non-indigenous members who are permanent residents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts). 71. With respect to implementation of the Accord, all indigenous community representatives consulted by the Special Rapporteur lamented the obstacle, and the delays that had been built up. Doubts had even been expressed as to whether the Government genuinely desired to make the Accord succeed. Of primary concern in this context was the fact that the Government had not transferred to the Regional Council the majority of the powers provided for under the Accord, thus rendering the Council inoperative. As a result, the Government continued to administer the Chittagong Hill Tracts directly (through its local representatives, the Deputy Commissioner and the army). Mention was also made of the delay in the setting up of the Land Commission (two and a half years) and in the return of land; the fact that a large part of the military presence had been maintained; and the fact that rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees was still incomplete. It was further noted that Bengalis continued to be settled in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although this process had not been planned by the Government, it did benefit from assistance 18 provided by local authorities (distribution of food rations and allocation of housing) and Muslim extremists. Because of the lack of arable land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, it was stated that apart from the Bengalis who were settled during the British period, and the few Bengalis who had settled legally, the rest of the Bengali population should return their land to the indigenous population and be resettled outside the region. It was explained that this was a precondition for any reconciliation between the authorities and the Bengalis, because the land was key to the survival and identity of the indigenous peoples in the region, and the essential and fundamental means for guaranteeing their survival and identity. 72. Apart from the issue of the implementation of the Peace Accord, with respect to the situation of indigenous peoples in the field of freedom of religion, most of those consulted said that they had been able to practise their religious activities freely since the end of the armed conflict. It was also mentioned that the army had stopped destroying indigenous places of worship. However, many representatives of the indigenous community described how they had been traumatized by the incident of 16 October 1999. Following an altercation between indigenous people of the Jumma tribe, which had arisen after a Bengali soldier had molested a Jumma woman, the army — assisted by around 150 Bengali civilians — attacked the Jumma of Babu Chara Bazar at Dighinala Thana/Khagrachari, leading to the deaths of three members of the indigenous population. The assailants also proceeded to sack the Buddhist temple of Benuban, attacked monks, and damaged statues of the Buddha. Even though a commission of enquiry had been set up, and some victims compensated, this particular incident had created a genuine feeling of insecurity among lay and religious members of the indigenous community in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, who were faced with an army and a police force consisting entirely of Muslim Bengalis. Those consulted also explained that their communities were subject to covert pressure from Islamic non-governmental organizations, and even Muslim extremist groups seeking to convert them to Islam, notably in return for services or money. Certain representatives interpreted the financial assistance provided by the State for the construction of new madrasahs and mosques as a discriminatory policy favouring Islam, since, in contrast, indigenous religious institutions received meagre public subsidies.