A/HRC/58/49 clear”. Nevertheless, it has kept the distinction between these concepts, as it asserted that “in comparison to torture, ill-treatment may differ in the severity of pain and suffering and does not require proof of impermissible purposes”.41 The Human Rights Committee has stated that it is unnecessary “to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied”.42 Similarly, regional human rights bodies consider that an act must have “a minimum level of severity” to be defined as ill-treatment, but this also depends on contextual factors.43 27. Given the importance of contextual aspects in the definition of torture and ill-treatment, religious and belief aspects must be taken seriously if a case calls for that. In this manner, those involved in the determination of torture and ill-treatment must understand the contextual religious and philosophical issues at stake to define more precisely the severity of pain inflicted on victims. C. Obligations 28. States have both positive and negative obligations with regard to the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, as well as the right to freedom of religion or belief. 29. Negative obligations in relation to the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and freedom of religion or belief require States not to infringe on those rights. For example, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Similarly, article 18 (2) of the Covenant stresses that “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”. These rights impose an obligation on the State not to commit torture nor to coerce anyone to change their religion or belief. 30. It follows from these rights that States cannot knowingly allow torture or coercion of anyone on the basis of their religion or belief. States often commit human rights violations through individuals representing the State, hence the Committee against Torture qualification of torture as acts of “pain or suffering … inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.44 While other treaties do not specify public officials in the prohibition of torture, a link between the violation of a human right and the State has to be established in order to assert responsibility. This link is evident when State officials commit human rights violations. 31. Positive obligations require States to take action to protect individuals’ rights. 45 Although not always apparent, these obligations derive from the above-mentioned documents. Using the same example as above of articles 7 and 18 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is not enough for States not to commit torture or coerce individuals to change their beliefs. States must also take preventive measures to ensure that violations of these rights do not occur. Consequently, the Human Rights Committee has clarified in relation to torture that “it is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity”.46 The Committee also indicates in its general comment No. 22 (1993) that States are required to take positive measures “to protect the 41 42 43 44 45 46 GE.24-24412 General comment No. 2 (2007), paras. 3 and 10. General comment No. 20 (1992), para. 4. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, Labita v. Italy, Application No. 26772/95, Judgment, 6 April 2000, para. 120; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ameziane v. United States of America, Report No. 29/20, Case No. 12.865, 22 April 2020, para. 138; and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, Communication No. 225/98 (2000), para. 41. Convention against Torture, art. 1. Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, “Positive and negative obligations”, in The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Shelton, ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 563. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 20 (1992), para. 2. 7