CCPR/C/131/D/3069/2017 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 28 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 29 All relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.30 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists,31 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 32 9.4 In regard to the author’s claims about his faith and conversion, regardless of the sincerity of the conversion, the test remains whether there are substantial grounds for believing that such a conversion may have sufficiently serious adverse consequences in the country of origin as to create a real risk of irreparable harm, as contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, even if it is found that the reported conversion is not sincere, the authorities should proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour and activities of the asylum seeker in connection with his or her conversion or convictions could have sufficiently serious adverse consequences in the country of origin as to put him or her at risk of irreparable harm.33 In that connection, the Committee recalls that States parties should give sufficient weight to the real and personal risk that a person might face if deported and considers that it was incumbent upon the State party to undertake an individualized assessment of the risk that the author would face in Afghanistan.34 9.5 In the present case, the Committee notes that the author claims that his allegation regarding his conversion was not adequately examined by the migration authorities. However, the Committee also notes that the State party argues that the author’s claim regarding the alleged conversion was not deemed to be credible, as the information about the conversion was raised at a very late stage of the asylum process and his explanation for the late submission was not convincing. The Committee also notes the decision of the Migration Board of 26 October 2017, in which it examined the author’s allegation concerning his conversion but considered there was a good reason to question the motives behind the author’s baptism, which took place on 22 October 2017 when he was taken into detention by the enforcing police authority. The Migration Board also took into account that the author had never mentioned his conversion before, even though he had had an opportunity to do so at the time of his first application for a re-examination. The fact that he claimed his conversion at a very late state of the asylum proceedings has affected the credibility of his information negatively, especially since at that time he had been in Sweden for more than two years and had had several chances to inform the migration authorities about his conversion earlier, in particular after April 2017 when his parents allegedly left Sweden. 9.6 In that regard, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that an author carries the burden of proof to support the allegations of a personal and real risk of irreparable harm if deported, including the obligation to submit evidence sufficiently in advance of the decisions of the national authorities, unless the information could not have been presented before.35 In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee considers the author’s claims about the risk to which he would be exposed in Afghanistan as a recent convert to be of a general and vague 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2; Q.A. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017), para. 9.3; A.E. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3300/2019), para 9.3. X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18; Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.3; A.E. v. Sweden, para 9.3. Ibid. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4; and Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. For example, K v. Denmark, para. 7.4; Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015) para. 7.3; and Rezaifar v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2512/2014), para. 9.3; Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.3 A.E. v. Sweden, para 9.3. S.A.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2419/2014), para. 11.8. Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.5, J.I. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3032/2017), para 7.5. See also European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden (judgment, 23 March 2016), para. 156. See A.B.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/126/D/2603/2015), para.9.10, Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.6. See, for example, I.K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/125/D/2373/2014), para. 9.7, M.P. et al. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2643/2015), para. 8.7, and A.E. v. Sweden, para.9.7. 11