A/HRC/62/35 arrangements with Nauru and, previously, with Papua New Guinea, is instructive. In a series of cases, including M.I. et al. v. Australia, Nabrahi v. Australia and A.A. v. Australia, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture rejected the arguments made by Australia that it did not exercise effective control over detention facilities in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Both Committees found that Australia’s funding, joint management, including monitoring, and contracting of service providers for the construction and operation of detention centres amounted to a sufficient degree of control and influence to establish jurisdiction under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture.110 44. With regard to measures aimed at preventing entry (see para. 9 above), the degree of involvement of externalizing States varies along a spectrum; however, even where such involvement is less direct, responsibility may arise where the conduct or support provided has a foreseeable impact. In relation to pushback measures, the European Court of Human Rights held in the Hirsi case that Italy exercised jurisdiction by intercepting migrants on the high seas and transferring them to Libya because it exercised continuous and exclusive control over the individuals, notwithstanding that they were outside its territory.111 Following Hirsi, Italy shifted from direct pushbacks to cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, which intercepts migrants at sea and returns them to Libya, where they face a real risk of serious human rights violations, with reduced Italian involvement (so-called “pullbacks”) (see para. 10). This approach was examined by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S.S., where the Court found that the role of Italy in coordinating and providing financial and logistical support to the Libyan Coast Guard was insufficient to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights. 112 This finding does not, however, preclude the possibility that different forms or degrees of involvement may give rise to such jurisdiction. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee, in the case of A.S., concerning a shipwreck resulting in approximately 200 deaths, found that Italy exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction, as the individuals were within its power or effective control due to a special relationship of dependency.113 VII. Measures to increase transparency and ensure accountability 45. Limited transparency is a recurring feature of externalization cooperation,114 due to its extraterritorial nature and the involvement of multiple actors. Arrangements often rely on informal and opaque instruments that escape parliamentary scrutiny and public debate, sometimes supplemented by non-public technical agreements. Complex funding mechanisms and multi-actor partnerships further obscure responsibility and weaken accountability, while increased use of surveillance technologies may hinder oversight. Strengthening transparency is therefore essential to reduce human rights risks, ensure accountability, and uphold the rule of law. A. Human rights risk assessments 46. Human rights risk assessments can strengthen transparency and accountability in migration cooperation, particularly when their findings are made public or shared with oversight bodies.115 A tool to operationalize States’ positive obligation to prevent human 110 111 112 113 114 115 GE.26-06322 M.I. et al. v. Australia (CCPR/C/142/D/2749/2016), paras. 9.5–9.9; Nabhari v. Australia (CCPR/C/142/D/3663/2019), paras. 7.6–7.15; and A.A. v. Australia (CAT/C/83/D/1079/2021), paras. 7.6–7.8. European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (application No. 27765/09), judgment of 23 February 2012, paras. 70, 74 and 81. European Court of Human Rights, S.S. and Others v. Italy (application No. 21660/18), decision on admissibility of 20 May 2025, paras. 100–108. A.S. et al. v. Italy (CCPR/C/130/D/3042/2017), para. 7.8. A/80/302, paras. 42–45. A/80/302, para. 46; and European Ombudsman, Decision on how the European Commission intends to guarantee respect for human rights in the context of the European Union-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (OI/2/2024/MHZ), 21 October 2024, para. 37. 15