A/79/169 described as a mixed mechanism. Most other specific institutions are genuinely consultative, for example, the National Council of Traditional Peoples and Communities in Brazil. 51 Dozens of countries have such consultative councils. Regarding such bodies, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities advises that such consultative mechanisms “should not substitute the work of mainstream government institutions on minorityrelated issues”. 52 The Special Rapporteur can only concur. Consultative or specialized government bodies may also be useful in the executive branch, in order to initiate or monitor minority-specific policies. If legislation and policies are legitimately tailored to the interests of the majority, such specialized or specific institutional arrangement s help persons belonging to minorities to influence legislation and policies addressing their own interests. It is less evident that such specific institutional designs allow minorities to effectively contribute to the shaping of society as a whole. IX. Effective participation of persons belonging to minorities through common institutional design 31. Participation in decision-making processes without a special institutional design implies that persons belonging to minorities may be able to be elected and influence political choices in the institutions that they join. Some systems guarantee reserved seats 53 for persons belonging to minorities, double votes for persons belonging to minorities 54 or lower (or even remove) the threshold for the number of votes required to obtain a seat in parliament.55 Usually, it is political parties that guarantee access to decision-making bodies. In single-party as well as multiparty systems, parties should be encouraged to place persons belonging to minorities in positions which give them a genuine chance of being elected. A quota system, for example, as provided for in the Electoral Regulation for the Constituent Assembly of Nepal 56 – and as has been implemented in numerous countries to promote the effective participation of women in elective bodies – could, in some cases, be an appropriate solution. Alternatively, “minority parties” may allow persons belonging to minorities to have acc ess to decision-making entities by competing in general elections. Several States in Europe have tried to restrain or ban “minority parties”. The European Court of Human Rights, basing its rulings on freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right to vote and stand for election – sometimes combined with a general provision banning discrimination – has upheld the right of persons belonging to minority groups to create and operate their own political parties in almost all cases. 57 Such access to political decision-making does not guarantee influence over the outcome of decision -making __________________ 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 16/20 Established by decree No. 8,750 of 9 May 2016. Thematic commentary No. 2 of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, para. 105. Available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublic CommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800bc7e8 . For a general view, see Andrew Reynolds, “Reserved seats in national legislatures: a research note”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2 (May 2005), pp. 301–310. See, for example, art. 8 of the Law on Self-governing Ethnic Communities of Slovenia of 5 October 1994. Available at www.svi-bz.org/uploads/tx_bh/231/law_on_self_governing_ ethnic_communities.pdf. See, for example, art. 137–140 of the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament of Serbia. Under art. 7, schedule 3, of the Election to the Members of the Constituent Assembly Act of Nepal, of 2007, parties fielding more than 100 candidates under the proportional representation system, in addition to allotting 50 per cent of seats to women, are requested to include in their candidate lists for the proportional segment of the election 37.8 per cent members of indigenous communities, 31.2 per cent Madhesis, 13 percent Dalits and 4 per cent members of other disadvantaged groups. The remaining 30.2 per cent of seats could be allotted to other persons. For a detailed analysis of relevant case law, see Lourdes Peroni, “Minorities before the European Court of Human Rights: democratic pluralism unfolded”, in International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka (eds), (Oxford, Oxford Academic, 2015). 24-13136