CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 3.5 I have not reached the same conclusions as the Committee has in paragraph 10.5 of the communication concerning the difficulties encountered by the author in defending her interests, which she argues resulted in a violation of her rights under article 2, subparagraphs (d) and (e), of the Convention. I do not share the Committee’s opinion that the reassignment of her case to different lawyers on several occasions points to discrimination against the author, and particularly not in the case of her complaint of marital violence. The author filed her first suit in May 1995, and her former partner died five months later from cancer. I do not see how the author could have been prejudiced by the change in the lawyer assigned to her case, since the first two suits and the amendment to the second of those suits were handled by the same attorney, who represented her from 1995 to 1998. According to the file, five lawyers handled her case. It is certainly possible that these changes may have hurt her case with regard to her property rights, but that does not necessarily mean that she was discriminated against. I do not believe that the file supports the conclusion that the author’s attorneys discriminated against her when they advised her to accept a financial settlement rather than seeking to recover her property rights to Parcel No. 138. In any event, after a certain point in time had been reached, it appears that an attempt to recover those rights would run into very considerable legal problems (since title to the property had changed hands), and advising the author to accept a financial settlement therefore does not appear to be a sign of discrimination but rather to be a recommendation based on a realistic assessment of the actual situation, although this would certainly be a painful realization for the author. This case went on for 10 years. Legal aid was provided to the author so that she could pursue legal action and engage in negotiations with the estate of W.S. and the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. After legal aid had been denied to her when she wanted to lodge an appeal in 2003, she succeeded in having it restored and was assigned counsel. The State party has cited objective reasons why the author had to work with five different attorneys: one left the region, one left the Government legal service; and another decided to resign from his position as the author’s counsel. That resignation does not appear to have been an inadmissible form of pressure that would have had a discriminatory effect because that attorney took that decision in 2002 after she had refused an offer of $20,000, which was apparently how much the property was worth. The author also received legal aid during the third court action, through which she sought to obtain what she had not secured in her second suit, even though she had not exhausted all available remedies in that second action. 3.6 I note that the judge who heard the third case ruled that, since the first two suits had not been examined on the merits, the author was entitled to bring that new action, which would therefore not constitute an abuse of legal process, as the respondents had claimed. That decision, taken on 21 July 2005, opened the way for a consideration of the merits of the author’s complaints, which had not taken place before, owing to the author’s failure to take the necessary steps in either of the two preceding legal actions. It would also have provided the author with an opportunity to include her complaints regarding alleged discrimination in the communication. That judge also ordered her to pay the court costs for the first two suits and to post security for costs for the new suit. Neither the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories to make the pursuit of the third legal action conditional upon payment by the author of the court costs of the two preceding suits and provision of security for costs for the third one, nor its establishment of a 60-day period in which to do so, appears to constitute discrimination. The author had not paid the court costs of the preceding suits and, given the way in which the earlier legal actions had proceeded, it was not unreasonable to require payment of past court costs and security for costs for the new suit. In view of these facts, I do not feel that it is justifiable to accuse the State party of not having given the author the chance to assert her rights. 3.7 Even though the author has questioned the quality of the legal assistance provided to her during the years in question, the first time that she made the claim that she was 23