CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 situation and her claims against it. This second suit was amended in July 1998 to include applications for damages and interest on a number of different grounds, and a petition that her title to half of the property and leasehold be recognized. 2.4 Various arrangements involving other dwellings or a financial settlement were proposed to the author in an effort to resolve the situation in some way other than by reinstating her title to one half of Parcel No. 138. Specifically, a financial settlement of $15,000 was offered to the author in May 1999, and one of $20,000 was offered in 2001. The author rejected these offers and instead chose to continue to attempt to recover title to her share of the property, but she did not reactivate the second civil suit which she had filed in 1996 and amended in 1998. That suit remained pending until 2003. 2.5 On 3 and 10 June 2003, respectively, the estate of W.S. and the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation filed motions to dismiss the author’s two suits for ―want of prosecution‖. On 27 October, the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories accepted the application for the dismissal of the first action. The author did not contest the dismissal of her first suit even though her complaints against her former partner and the various claims that she had made had not been examined on the merits. The Canadian courts have therefore not had the opportunity to consider the author’s complaints on the merits; nor did the author provide information about her claims of discrimination. The author did, however, lodge an application with the Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territories to overturn the decision taken by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories to dismiss her second civil action for ―want of prosecution‖ on 3 November 2003. The Court of Appeal rejected her application but did not issue its reasons for doing so in writing. The author did not appeal that decision before the Supreme Court of Canada and did not apprise the Canadian courts of the reasons why she did not or could not do so. Existing treaty body jurisprudence indicates that, given the intended purpose of the requirement regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, this procedural rule should not be overridden unless there are compelling reasons for its waiver. The absence of a written reasoned decision from the Court of Appeal cannot be regarded as such a reason. Unlike the Committee (para. 7.3 of the communication), I do not think that an appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada would be unlikely to bring effective relief to the author. Even if that remedy had given rise to no more than a limited consideration of the procedural issue related to the author’s inaction between, respectively, 1996/1998 and 2003, it could have led to a decision in the author’s favour. If the Supreme Court of Canada had found that the five-year delay during which the author had not taken any court action was excusable because, for example, negotiations were being held between the author and the other parties during that period, then the Supreme Court could have referred the case back to a lower court for an examination of the merits. By failing to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the author precluded the consideration of her communication by the Committee, since she has not exhausted the available domestic remedies. In my view, this first reason suffices to render the communication inadmissible under article 1, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol. 2.6 The fact that a third legal action was brought does not make up for the author’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies in connection with the second legal action. The author did not take effective action to contest the court decision concerning her second suit under the applicable rules of procedure. She therefore cannot, in my opinion, cite the third suit, which had the same objective as the second, to rebut the argument that she failed to exhaust domestic remedies in the second legal action, since to do so would render the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted — a requirement cited on numerous occasions by the 20