- 26 49. Ukraine maintains that a number of events documented by the evidence presented by it
establish offences covered by Article 2, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT. It asserts that Russian officials
supplied the missile launching system that was used to shoot down flight MH17. Ukraine argues
that this launching system was “knowingly provided” to a terrorist organization, and that the
requirement of knowledge under Article 2, paragraph 1, was amply met. Ukraine contends that the
shooting down of the aircraft constituted a violation of the Montreal Convention and that the
supply of the launching system was an offence under Article 2, paragraph 1 (a), of the ICSFT.
Moreover, Ukraine argues that its Memorial shows that bombing attacks by the
Russian Federation’s “proxies” constituted offences under the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and that the alleged knowledge of financing the attacks,
including through the supply of bombs, was covered by Article 2, paragraph 1 (a), of the ICSFT.
50. With regard to other incidents, Ukraine argues that the evidence presented demonstrates
that certain events of indiscriminate shelling such as those that occurred in Volnovakha and
Mariupol constituted acts of terrorism under Article 2, paragraph 1 (b), of the ICSFT because these
acts were performed by the Russian Federation’s “proxies” with the intent to kill civilians and for
the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government. Concerning further
allegations of acts of torture and killings, Ukraine submits that those acts were performed with the
objective of terrorizing a civilian population.
51. Ukraine contends that the Russian Federation’s arguments with regard to the
interpretation of the different elements of Article 2 of the ICSFT belong to the merits, and that they
do not have an impact on the Court’s jurisdiction. The Applicant argues that, if the Court were now
to proceed to such interpretation, it would “prematurely determine some elements of this dispute on
the merits”. Ukraine submits that such issues of interpretation are “inseparable from the factual
questions” and in any event do not possess an exclusively preliminary character.
52. If however the Court were to find it necessary to give an interpretation of Article 2 of the
ICSFT at the present stage of the proceedings, Ukraine argues that the Russian Federation’s
restrictive reading should be dismissed. The Applicant submits that Article 2, paragraph 1 (a)
and (b), of the ICSFT gives a broad and comprehensive definition of acts of terrorism. It also
maintains that the notion of “‘funds’ under Article 1 of the ICSFT is a broad term covering all
property, including weapons”.
53. In Ukraine’s view, the term “any person” in Article 2, paragraph 1, includes both private
individuals and public or government officials. Relying on a textual interpretation of the treaty
provisions, read in their context, Ukraine contends that Article 18 imposes on States an obligation
to prevent terrorism financing offences and that, according to Article 2, such offences may be
committed by “‘any person’, without qualification”. It maintains that concluding otherwise would
be “paradoxical” as the ICSFT would bind a State to prevent the financing of acts of terrorism, but
would not prohibit financing by officials of the same State. Ukraine also argues that the
Russian Federation’s interpretation undermines the object and purpose of the ICSFT and that its