(b) The military members of the Supreme Military Court are appointed by the Crown. They are discharged after reaching the age of 70; (c) The military members of the Supreme Military Court do not hold any function in the military hierarchy. Their salaries are paid by the Ministry of Justice; (d) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court have to take an oath before they can take up their appointment. They swear or vow to act in a fair and impartial way; (e) The president and the members of the Supreme Military Court do not owe any obedience nor are they accountable to any one regarding their decisions; (f) As a rule the sessions of the Supreme Military Court are public. 4.3 The State party points out that national and international judgements have confirmed the impartiality and independence of the military courts in the Netherlands. Reference is made to the Enqel Case of the European Court of Human Rights a/ and to the judgement of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 17 May 1988. 4.4 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State party claims that the Act on Conscientious Objection to Military Service (Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst) is an effective remedy to insuperable objections to military service. The State party contends that, as the author has not invoked the Act, he has thus failed to exhaust domestic remedies. 4.5 The State party contends that the other elements of the applicant's communication are unsubstantiated. It concludes that the author has no claim under article 2 of the Optional Protocol and that his communication should accordingly be declared inadmissible. 5.1 In his reply to the State party's observations, the author claims that the Conscientious Objection Act has a limited scope and that it may be invoked only by conscripts who meet the requirements of section 2 of the Act. The author rejects the assertion that section 2 is sufficiently broad to cover the objections maintained by "total objectors" to conscription and alternate civilian service. He argues that the question is not whether the author should have invoked the Conscientious Objection Act, but whether the State party has the right to force the author to become an accomplice to a crime against peace by requiring him to do military service. 5.2 The author contends that the State party cannot claim that the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed the impartiality and independence of the Netherlands court-martial procedure (Military Court). 5.3 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies the author explains that he was convicted by the court of first instance and that his appeals were heard and rejected by both the Supreme Military Court and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. He argues, therefore, that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies has been fully complied with. -408-